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From: enh <enh@google.com>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>,
	Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net>,
	 Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org,  jannh@google.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org,  adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org,
	oleg@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	jorgelo@chromium.org,  sroettger@google.com, ojeda@kernel.org,
	adobriyan@gmail.com,  anna-maria@linutronix.de,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, linus.walleij@linaro.org,  Jason@zx2c4.com,
	deller@gmx.de, rdunlap@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net,
	 hch@lst.de, peterx@redhat.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	f.fainelli@gmail.com,  gerg@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mingo@kernel.org,  ardb@kernel.org,
	Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, mhocko@suse.com,  42.hyeyoo@gmail.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, ardb@google.com,  rientjes@google.com,
	groeck@chromium.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
	 Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
	 Mike Rapoport <mike.rapoport@gmail.com>,
	 Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 14:35:18 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJgzZop04=7+13jjV_zDfJF4dyJ7tp-86G8_mRe=C=sBEp+z3Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABi2SkWoNTd5sRJ7-7arPfutYZx6xi9iac0mXZyfzuVXuh1atA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jan 17, 2025 at 1:20 PM Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 9:18 AM Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 5:02 PM Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Lorenzo,
> > >
> > > On Thu, 2025-01-16 at 15:48 +0000, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 12:20:59PM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 11:46 AM Lorenzo Stoakes
> > > > > <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > [SNIP]
> > > > >
> > > > > > I've made it abundantly clear that this (NACKed) series cannot allow the
> > > > > > kernel to be in a broken state even if a user sets flags to do so.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This is because users might lack context to make this decision and
> > > > > > incorrectly do so, and now we ship a known-broken kernel.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > You are now suggesting disabling the !CRIU requirement. Which violates my
> > > > > > _requirements_ (not optional features).
> > > > > >
> > > > > Sure, I can add CRIU back.
> > > > >
> > > > > Are you fine with UML and gViso not working under this CONFIG ?
> > > > > UML/gViso doesn't use any KCONFIG like CRIU does.
> > > >
> > > > Yeah this is a concern, wouldn't we be able to catch UML with a flag?
> > > >
> > > > Apologies my fault for maybe not being totally up to date with this, but what
> > > > exactly was the gViso (is it gVisor actually?)
> > >
> > > UML is a separate architecture. It is a Linux kernel running as a
> > > userspace application on top of an unmodified host kernel.
> > >
> > > So really, UML is a mostly weird userspace program for the purpose of
> > > this discussion. And a pretty buggy one too--it got broken by rseq
> > > already.
> > >
> > > What UML now does is:
> > >  * Execute a tiny static binary
> > >  * map special "stub" code/data pages at the topmost userspace address
> > >    (replacing its stack)
> > >  * continue execution inside the "stub" pages
> > >  * unmap everything below the "stub" pages
> > >  * use the unmap'ed area for userspace application mappings
> > >
> > > I believe that the "unmap everything" step will fail with this feature.
> > >
> > >
> > > Now, I am sure one can come up with solutions, e.g.:
> > >    1. Simply print an explanation if the unmap() fails
> > >    2. Find an address that is guaranteed to be below the VDSO and use a
> > >       smaller address space for the UML userspace.
> > >    3. Somehow tell the host kernel to not install the VDSO mappings
> > >    4. Add the host VDSO pages as a sealed VMA within UML to guard them
> > >
> > > UML is a bit of a niche and I am not sure it is worth worrying about it
> > > too much.
> >
> > I've been absent from this patch series in general, but this gave me
> > an idea: what if we let userspace seal these mappings itself? Since
> > glibc is already sealing things, it might as well seal these?
> > And then systems that _do_ care about this would set the glibc tunable
> > and deal with the breakage.
> >
> > Is there something seriously wrong with this approach? Besides maybe
> > not having a super easy way to discover these mappings atm, I feel
> > like it would solve all of the policy issues people have been talking
> > about in these threads.
> >
> There are technical difficulties to seal vdso/vvar from the glibc
> side. The dynamic linker lacks vdso/vvar mapping size information, and
> architectural variations for vdso/vvar also means sealing from the
> kernel side is a simpler solution. Adhemerval has more details in case
> clarification is needed from the glibc side.

as a maintainer of a different linux libc, i've long wanted a "tell me
everything there is to know about this vma" syscall rather than having
to parse /proc/maps...

...but in this special case, is the vdso/vvar size ever anything other
than "one page" in practice?

> Additionally, uprobe mapping can't be sealed by the dynamic linker,
> dynamic linker can only apply sealing during execve() and dlopen(),
> uprobe mapping isn't created during those two calls.
>
> -Jeff
>
>
> > --
> > Pedro


  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-17 19:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-25 20:20 [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal " jeffxu
2024-11-25 20:20 ` [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal " jeffxu
2024-11-25 20:40   ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-12-02 17:22     ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-02 17:57       ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-02 20:05         ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-02 19:57       ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-02 18:29   ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-02 20:38     ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-03  7:35       ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-03 18:19         ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-03 20:16           ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-04 14:04   ` Benjamin Berg
2024-12-04 17:43     ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-04 18:24       ` Benjamin Berg
2024-12-10  4:12   ` Andrei Vagin
2024-12-11 22:46     ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-13  6:33       ` Andrei Vagin
2024-12-16 18:35         ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-16 18:56           ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-12-16 20:20             ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-17 22:18   ` Kees Cook
2025-01-02 19:15     ` Andrei Vagin
2025-01-03 20:48     ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-01-07  1:17       ` Kees Cook
2025-02-04 18:17       ` Johannes Berg
2025-01-03 21:38     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-07  1:12       ` Kees Cook
2025-01-13 21:26         ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-14  4:19           ` Matthew Wilcox
2025-01-15 19:02           ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-15 19:46             ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-15 20:20               ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-16 15:48                 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-16 17:01                   ` Benjamin Berg
2025-01-16 17:16                     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-16 17:18                     ` Pedro Falcato
2025-01-17 18:20                       ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-17 19:35                         ` enh [this message]
2025-01-17 20:15                           ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-17 22:08                           ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-01-21 15:38                             ` enh
2025-01-22 17:23                               ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-01-22 22:29                                 ` enh
2025-01-23  8:40                                   ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-01-23 21:50                                     ` enh
2025-01-23 22:38                                       ` Matthew Wilcox
2025-02-06 14:19                                         ` enh
2025-02-06 13:20                           ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-02-06 14:38                             ` enh
2025-02-06 15:28                               ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-02-06 15:51                                 ` enh
2025-02-06 16:37                                   ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-01-17 18:08                   ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-15 23:52               ` Kees Cook
2025-01-16  5:26                 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-01-16 19:40                   ` Kees Cook
2025-01-17 10:14                     ` Heiko Carstens
2025-01-16 15:34                 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-16 19:44                   ` Kees Cook
2024-11-26 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal " Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-02 17:28   ` Jeff Xu

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