From: enh <enh@google.com>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>,
Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org,
oleg@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
jorgelo@chromium.org, sroettger@google.com, ojeda@kernel.org,
adobriyan@gmail.com, anna-maria@linutronix.de,
mark.rutland@arm.com, linus.walleij@linaro.org, Jason@zx2c4.com,
deller@gmx.de, rdunlap@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net,
hch@lst.de, peterx@redhat.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
f.fainelli@gmail.com, gerg@kernel.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mingo@kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, mhocko@suse.com, 42.hyeyoo@gmail.com,
peterz@infradead.org, ardb@google.com, rientjes@google.com,
groeck@chromium.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
Mike Rapoport <mike.rapoport@gmail.com>,
Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 14:35:18 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJgzZop04=7+13jjV_zDfJF4dyJ7tp-86G8_mRe=C=sBEp+z3Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABi2SkWoNTd5sRJ7-7arPfutYZx6xi9iac0mXZyfzuVXuh1atA@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Jan 17, 2025 at 1:20 PM Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 9:18 AM Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 5:02 PM Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Lorenzo,
> > >
> > > On Thu, 2025-01-16 at 15:48 +0000, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 12:20:59PM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 11:46 AM Lorenzo Stoakes
> > > > > <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > [SNIP]
> > > > >
> > > > > > I've made it abundantly clear that this (NACKed) series cannot allow the
> > > > > > kernel to be in a broken state even if a user sets flags to do so.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This is because users might lack context to make this decision and
> > > > > > incorrectly do so, and now we ship a known-broken kernel.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > You are now suggesting disabling the !CRIU requirement. Which violates my
> > > > > > _requirements_ (not optional features).
> > > > > >
> > > > > Sure, I can add CRIU back.
> > > > >
> > > > > Are you fine with UML and gViso not working under this CONFIG ?
> > > > > UML/gViso doesn't use any KCONFIG like CRIU does.
> > > >
> > > > Yeah this is a concern, wouldn't we be able to catch UML with a flag?
> > > >
> > > > Apologies my fault for maybe not being totally up to date with this, but what
> > > > exactly was the gViso (is it gVisor actually?)
> > >
> > > UML is a separate architecture. It is a Linux kernel running as a
> > > userspace application on top of an unmodified host kernel.
> > >
> > > So really, UML is a mostly weird userspace program for the purpose of
> > > this discussion. And a pretty buggy one too--it got broken by rseq
> > > already.
> > >
> > > What UML now does is:
> > > * Execute a tiny static binary
> > > * map special "stub" code/data pages at the topmost userspace address
> > > (replacing its stack)
> > > * continue execution inside the "stub" pages
> > > * unmap everything below the "stub" pages
> > > * use the unmap'ed area for userspace application mappings
> > >
> > > I believe that the "unmap everything" step will fail with this feature.
> > >
> > >
> > > Now, I am sure one can come up with solutions, e.g.:
> > > 1. Simply print an explanation if the unmap() fails
> > > 2. Find an address that is guaranteed to be below the VDSO and use a
> > > smaller address space for the UML userspace.
> > > 3. Somehow tell the host kernel to not install the VDSO mappings
> > > 4. Add the host VDSO pages as a sealed VMA within UML to guard them
> > >
> > > UML is a bit of a niche and I am not sure it is worth worrying about it
> > > too much.
> >
> > I've been absent from this patch series in general, but this gave me
> > an idea: what if we let userspace seal these mappings itself? Since
> > glibc is already sealing things, it might as well seal these?
> > And then systems that _do_ care about this would set the glibc tunable
> > and deal with the breakage.
> >
> > Is there something seriously wrong with this approach? Besides maybe
> > not having a super easy way to discover these mappings atm, I feel
> > like it would solve all of the policy issues people have been talking
> > about in these threads.
> >
> There are technical difficulties to seal vdso/vvar from the glibc
> side. The dynamic linker lacks vdso/vvar mapping size information, and
> architectural variations for vdso/vvar also means sealing from the
> kernel side is a simpler solution. Adhemerval has more details in case
> clarification is needed from the glibc side.
as a maintainer of a different linux libc, i've long wanted a "tell me
everything there is to know about this vma" syscall rather than having
to parse /proc/maps...
...but in this special case, is the vdso/vvar size ever anything other
than "one page" in practice?
> Additionally, uprobe mapping can't be sealed by the dynamic linker,
> dynamic linker can only apply sealing during execve() and dlopen(),
> uprobe mapping isn't created during those two calls.
>
> -Jeff
>
>
> > --
> > Pedro
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-17 19:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-25 20:20 [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal " jeffxu
2024-11-25 20:20 ` [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal " jeffxu
2024-11-25 20:40 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-12-02 17:22 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-02 17:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-02 20:05 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-02 19:57 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-02 18:29 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-02 20:38 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-03 7:35 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-03 18:19 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-03 20:16 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-04 14:04 ` Benjamin Berg
2024-12-04 17:43 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-04 18:24 ` Benjamin Berg
2024-12-10 4:12 ` Andrei Vagin
2024-12-11 22:46 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-13 6:33 ` Andrei Vagin
2024-12-16 18:35 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-16 18:56 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-12-16 20:20 ` Jeff Xu
2024-12-17 22:18 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-02 19:15 ` Andrei Vagin
2025-01-03 20:48 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-01-07 1:17 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-04 18:17 ` Johannes Berg
2025-01-03 21:38 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-07 1:12 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-13 21:26 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-14 4:19 ` Matthew Wilcox
2025-01-15 19:02 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-15 19:46 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-15 20:20 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-16 15:48 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-16 17:01 ` Benjamin Berg
2025-01-16 17:16 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-16 17:18 ` Pedro Falcato
2025-01-17 18:20 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-17 19:35 ` enh [this message]
2025-01-17 20:15 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-17 22:08 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-01-21 15:38 ` enh
2025-01-22 17:23 ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-01-22 22:29 ` enh
2025-01-23 8:40 ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-01-23 21:50 ` enh
2025-01-23 22:38 ` Matthew Wilcox
2025-02-06 14:19 ` enh
2025-02-06 13:20 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-02-06 14:38 ` enh
2025-02-06 15:28 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-02-06 15:51 ` enh
2025-02-06 16:37 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2025-01-17 18:08 ` Jeff Xu
2025-01-15 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-16 5:26 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-01-16 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-17 10:14 ` Heiko Carstens
2025-01-16 15:34 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2025-01-16 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2024-11-26 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 0/1] Seal " Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-12-02 17:28 ` Jeff Xu
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