From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: prevent a task from writing on its own /proc/*/mem
Date: Sat, 26 May 2018 19:30:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJHCu1LgSUJdiZEfParCH7aLERWM1bgwC7e8wQKgmkNE01_4KA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180526154819.GA14016@avx2>
2018-05-26 17:48 GMT+02:00 Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>:
> On Sat, May 26, 2018 at 04:50:46PM +0200, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
>> Prevent a task from opening, in "write" mode, any /proc/*/mem
>> file that operates on the task's mm.
>> /proc/*/mem is mainly a debugging means and, as such, it shouldn't
>> be used by the inspected process itself.
>> Current implementation always allow a task to access its own
>> /proc/*/mem file.
>> A process can use it to overwrite read-only memory, making
>> pointless the use of security_file_mprotect() or other ways to
>> enforce RO memory.
>
> You can do it in security_ptrace_access_check()
No, because that hook is skipped when mm == current->mm:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc6/source/kernel/fork.c#L1111
> or security_file_open()
This is true, but it looks a bit overkill to me, especially since many of
the macros/functions used to handle proc's files won't be in scope
for an external LSM.
Is there any particular reason why you prefer it done via LSM?
Thank you,
Salvatore
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-26 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-26 14:50 Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 15:48 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-26 17:30 ` Salvatore Mesoraca [this message]
2018-05-26 17:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-26 17:58 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-27 0:31 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-27 1:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-27 14:41 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-28 9:32 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-28 9:06 ` Jann Horn
2018-05-28 9:33 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
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