From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
ndesaulniers@google.com, joao@overdrivepizza.com
Subject: Re: [PATCHv14 08/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 09:18:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiwiA7FdSww9fTg59r5S7G-DZHtzAcq9u5zBJKYXc1agQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y8a4bmCU9wsenvvF@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Jan 17, 2023 at 7:02 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 17, 2023 at 04:57:03PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 17, 2023 at 02:05:22PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jan 11, 2023 at 03:37:27PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > >
> > > > #define __untagged_addr(untag_mask, addr)
> > > > u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr); \
> > > > - s64 sign = (s64)__addr >> 63; \
> > > > - __addr &= untag_mask | sign; \
> > > > + if (static_branch_likely(&tagged_addr_key)) { \
> > > > + s64 sign = (s64)__addr >> 63; \
> > > > + __addr &= untag_mask | sign; \
> > > > + } \
> > > > (__force __typeof__(addr))__addr; \
> > > > })
> > > >
> > > > #define untagged_addr(addr) __untagged_addr(current_untag_mask(), addr)
> > >
> > > Is the compiler clever enough to put the memop inside the branch?
> >
> > Hm. You mean current_untag_mask() inside static_branch_likely()?
> >
> > But it is preprocessor who does this, not compiler. So, yes, the memop is
> > inside the branch.
> >
> > Or I didn't understand your question.
>
> Nah, call it a pre-lunch dip, I overlooked the whole CPP angle -- d'0h.
>
> That said, I did just put it through a compiler to see wth it did and it
> is pretty gross:
Yeah, I think the static branch likely just makes things worse.
And if we really want to make the "no untag mask exists" case better,
I think the code should probably use static_branch_unlikely() rather
than *_likely(). That should make it jump to the masking code, and
leave the unmasked code as a fallthrough, no?
The reason clang seems to generate saner code is that clang seems to
largely ignore the whole "__builtin_expect()", at least not to the
point where it tries to make the unlikely case be out-of-line.
But on the whole, I think we'd be better off without this whole static branch.
The cost of "untagged_addr()" generally shouldn't be worth this. There
are few performance-crticial users - the most common case is, I think,
just mmap() and friends, and the single load is going to be a
non-issue there.
Looking around, I think the only situation where we may care is
strnlen_user() and strncpy_from_user(). Those *can* be
performance-critical. They're used for paths and for execve() strings,
and can be a bit hot.
And both of those cases actually just use it because of the whole
"maximum address" calculation to avoid traversing into kernel
addresses, so I wonder if we could use alternatives there, kind of
like the get_user/put_user cases did. Except it's generic code, so ..
But maybe even those aren't worth worrying about. At least they do the
unmasking outside the loop - although then in the case of execve(),
the string copies themselves are obviously done in a loop anyway.
Kirill, do you have clear numbers for that static key being a noticeable win?
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-17 17:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-11 12:37 [PATCHv14 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-18 15:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-18 15:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-18 16:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-18 17:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 13:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-11 14:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 14:37 ` [PATCHv14.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 07/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 08/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-17 13:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-17 13:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-17 15:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-17 17:18 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2023-01-17 17:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 18:26 ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-01-17 18:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 19:17 ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-01-17 20:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 20:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 18:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-17 18:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-19 23:06 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-18 16:49 ` [PATCHv14 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Peter Zijlstra
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