From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
jeffxu@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org, jannh@google.com,
sroettger@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
usama.anjum@collabora.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com, rdunlap@infradead.org,
jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com,
dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 20:36:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiW4V5HRQ5Jm_MnSMVTeivS_4kdm1dnc08d03UKzmyp+A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240515025811.GA1232@1wt.eu>
On Tue, 14 May 2024 at 20:13, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
>
> Wouldn't it be more effective to have a non-resettable prctl() allowing
> the application to prefer to be killed upon such an munmap() failure in
> order to stay consistent and more robust against such class of attacks?
This whole argument is based on a castle of sand, and some notion that
this is a problem in the first place.
Guys, if you let untrusted code execute random system calls, the whole
"look, now unmap() acts oddly" IS THE LEAST OF YOUR ISSUES.
This whole "problem" is made-up. It's not real. Theo is literally
upset about something that Linux has done forever, and that has never
been an issue.
Stop inventing make-believe problems - there are enough *real* bugs
people can look at that you really don't need to.
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-15 3:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-15 16:35 jeffxu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 1/5] mseal: Wire up mseal syscall jeffxu
2024-04-15 18:12 ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-15 18:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-15 19:06 ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 2/5] mseal: add " jeffxu
2024-04-16 14:59 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-04-16 15:17 ` Jann Horn
2024-04-16 16:42 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 3/5] selftest mm/mseal memory sealing jeffxu
2024-04-15 18:32 ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-15 20:27 ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-16 0:34 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-02 11:24 ` Ryan Roberts
2024-05-02 15:18 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-02 22:39 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-03 8:30 ` Ryan Roberts
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 4/5] mseal:add documentation jeffxu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 5/5] selftest mm/mseal read-only elf memory segment jeffxu
2024-04-16 15:13 ` [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal Liam R. Howlett
2024-04-16 19:40 ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-18 20:19 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 1:22 ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-19 14:57 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 15:14 ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-19 16:54 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 17:59 ` Pedro Falcato
2024-04-20 1:23 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-14 17:46 ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-14 19:52 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-23 23:32 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-23 23:54 ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-24 15:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-14 20:59 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-05-14 21:28 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-05-14 22:48 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-14 23:01 ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-14 23:47 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15 2:58 ` Willy Tarreau
2024-05-15 3:36 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2024-05-15 4:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15 6:14 ` Willy Tarreau
2024-05-15 0:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15 0:57 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15 1:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15 1:47 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15 2:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15 2:42 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15 4:53 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-14 21:28 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-15 17:18 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-15 22:19 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-16 0:59 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-21 16:00 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-21 20:55 ` Jeff Xu
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