From: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>,
oe-lkp@lists.linux.dev, lkp@intel.com,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ying.huang@intel.com,
feng.tang@intel.com, fengwei.yin@intel.com
Subject: Re: [linux-next:master] [lockref] d042dae6ad: unixbench.throughput -33.7% regression
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 16:11:25 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGudoHHkxyCkLZ4xwQ9ho5uy0TQ4K1ENJMmSYDZkaZw6YF4VEA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240703-haftstrafe-anbringen-88ed445e77a4@brauner>
On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 4:09 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > As a side note this is where I should also note the *current* LSM hooks
> > are racy as is. Suppose you can stat a particular file now, but a chown
> > to 1234 means you can't. Then your stat call can race against chown +
> > other ops. You can end up in a state where LSMs gave a green light and
> > only then the state changed to one you are not allowed to look at. This
>
> Fwiw, we've discussed this before. And my opinion is that we should
> absolute not care about this. I have no interest in complicating path
> lookup or any codepath to make these hooks less racy. This raciness they
> have to deal with. This is not a comment on your patch but just that the
> raciness of security hooks is not a problem we should care to solve
> imho. If we go down that road we'll all slowly go insane trying to give
> state change guarantees to layers that hook into the VFS in really odd
> locations.
Well I noted I have no interest in working on it anyway, so... I think
we are good here on this front :)
--
Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik gmail.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-03 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-27 2:41 kernel test robot
2024-06-27 6:25 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-27 7:00 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-27 16:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-06-27 16:55 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-27 16:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-06-27 17:20 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-06-27 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-02 7:19 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 12:10 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 16:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-02 17:02 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 17:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-02 17:46 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 17:58 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 18:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-02 20:33 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 20:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-02 21:15 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-02 22:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-03 13:53 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-07-03 14:08 ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-03 14:11 ` Mateusz Guzik [this message]
2024-07-03 16:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-03 8:34 ` Christian Brauner
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