From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 12/35] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 17:05:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=VoCfRAKqesutB6eP2Qi0aG8Tyq4zqoiy0_A3MJDQAEfw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5a8a3c85760c19be66965630418e09a820f79277.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Fri, Jun 14, 2024 at 1:44 AM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2024-06-13 at 16:30 -0700, SeongJae Park wrote:
> > Hi Ilya,
> >
> > On Thu, 13 Jun 2024 17:34:14 +0200 Ilya Leoshkevich
> > <iii@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing
> > > kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing
> > > init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset().
> > >
> > > There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object()
> > > can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be
> > > used
> > > with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the
> > > function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is
> > > not a
> > > concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may
> > > change
> > > in the future.
> > >
> > > Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset()
> > > calls.
> > > The downside is that init_object() is called from
> > > free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the
> > > distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> > > ---
> > > mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 2 +-
> > > mm/slub.c | 13 +++++++++----
> > > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > >
> > [...]
> > > --- a/mm/slub.c
> > > +++ b/mm/slub.c
> > > @@ -1139,7 +1139,12 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache
> > > *s, void *object, u8 val)
> > > unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size;
> > >
> > > if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
> > > - memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
> > > + /*
> > > + * Use __memset() here and below in order to avoid
> > > overwriting
> > > + * the KMSAN shadow. Keeping the shadow makes it
> > > possible to
> > > + * distinguish uninit-value from use-after-free.
> > > + */
> > > + __memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s-
> > > >red_left_pad);
> >
> > I found my build test[1] fails with below error on latest mm-unstable
> > branch.
> > 'git bisect' points me this patch.
> >
> > CC mm/slub.o
> > /mm/slub.c: In function 'init_object':
> > /mm/slub.c:1147:17: error: implicit declaration of function
> > '__memset'; did you mean 'memset'? [-Werror=implicit-function-
> > declaration]
> > 1147 | __memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s-
> > >red_left_pad);
> > | ^~~~~~~~
> > | memset
> > cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
> >
> > I haven't looked in deep, but reporting first. Do you have any idea?
> >
> > [1]
> > https://github.com/awslabs/damon-tests/blob/next/corr/tests/build_m68k.sh
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> > SJ
> >
> > [...]
>
> Thanks for the report.
>
> Apparently not all architectures have __memset(). We should probably go
> back to memset_no_sanitize_memory() [1], but this time mark it with
> noinline __maybe_unused __no_sanitize_memory, like it's done in, e.g.,
> 32/35.
>
> Alexander, what do you think?
We could probably go without __no_sanitize_memory assuming that
platforms supporting KMSAN always have __memset():
#if defined(CONFIG_KMSAN)
static inline void *memset_no_sanitize_memory(void *s, int c, size_t n)
{
return __memset(s, c, n);
}
#else
static inline void *memset_no_sanitize_memory(void *s, int c, size_t n)
{
return memset(s, c, n);
}
#endif
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-18 15:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-13 15:34 [PATCH v4 00/35] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 01/35] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 16:21 ` Steven Rostedt
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 02/35] kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 03/35] kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 04/35] kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 07/35] kmsan: Remove a useless assignment from kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 08/35] kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 09/35] kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 15:35 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 11/35] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 12:22 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 12/35] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 23:30 ` SeongJae Park
[not found] ` <5a8a3c85760c19be66965630418e09a820f79277.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 15:05 ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 13/35] kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 15/35] mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 14:21 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 17/35] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 18/35] lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 19/35] kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 20/35] s390/boot: Turn off KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 21/35] s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 22/35] s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 23/35] s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 25/35] s390/cpumf: Unpoison STCCTM output buffer Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 26/35] s390/diag: Unpoison diag224() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 9:26 ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 27/35] s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 28/35] s390/irqflags: Do not instrument arch_local_irq_*() with KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 29/35] s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 30/35] s390/string: Add KMSAN support Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 33/35] s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 34/35] s390: Implement the architecture-specific KMSAN functions Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 35/35] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 15:36 ` Alexander Potapenko
[not found] ` <20240613153924.961511-33-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 9:24 ` [PATCH v4 32/35] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user() Alexander Potapenko
[not found] ` <e91768f518876ec9b53ffa8069b798107434d0dd.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 9:52 ` Alexander Potapenko
[not found] ` <20240613153924.961511-15-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 14:37 ` [PATCH v4 14/35] kmsan: Do not round up pg_data_t size Alexander Potapenko
[not found] ` <20240613153924.961511-17-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 14:38 ` [PATCH v4 16/35] mm: slub: Unpoison the memchr_inv() return value Alexander Potapenko
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