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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	 David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	 Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>,
	 Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	 "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	 Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
	 Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	 Linux-Arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 38/48] objtool: kmsan: list KMSAN API functions as uaccess-safe
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 17:30:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=UzshCuwbq7pZ93v7+eVUgFq1dZ4L_9nEWhYnotmyZtJg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220330084615.GH8939@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3681 bytes --]

On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:46 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 29, 2022 at 02:40:07PM +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > KMSAN inserts API function calls in a lot of places (function entries
> > and exits, local variables, memory accesses), so they may get called
> > from the uaccess regions as well.
>
> That's insufficient. Explain how you did the right thing and made these
> functions actually safe to be called in this context.
>
> KMSAN API functions are used to update the metadata (shadow/origin pages)
for kernel memory accesses.
The metadata pages for kernel pointers are also located in the kernel
memory, so touching them is not a problem.
For userspace pointers, no metadata is allocated.

If an API function is supposed to read or modify the metadata, it does so
for kernel pointers and ignores userspace pointers.
If an API function is supposed to return a pair of metadata pointers for
the instrumentation to use (like all __msan_metadata_ptr_for_TYPE_SIZE()
functions do), it returns the allocated metadata for kernel pointers and
special dummy buffers residing in the kernel memory for userspace pointers.

As a result, none of KMSAN API functions perform userspace accesses, but
since they might be called from UACCESS regions they
use user_access_save/restore().

Does this make sense?


> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > ---
> > Link:
> https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I242bc9816273fecad4ea3d977393784396bb3c35
> > ---
> >  tools/objtool/check.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > index 7c33ec67c4a95..8518eaf05bff0 100644
> > --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> > +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > @@ -943,6 +943,25 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
> >       "__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4",
> >       "__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8",
> >       "__sanitizer_cov_trace_switch",
> > +     /* KMSAN */
> > +     "kmsan_copy_to_user",
> > +     "kmsan_report",
> > +     "kmsan_unpoison_memory",
> > +     "__msan_chain_origin",
> > +     "__msan_get_context_state",
> > +     "__msan_instrument_asm_store",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_1",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_2",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_4",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_n",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_store_1",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_store_2",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_store_4",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_store_8",
> > +     "__msan_metadata_ptr_for_store_n",
> > +     "__msan_poison_alloca",
> > +     "__msan_warning",
> >       /* UBSAN */
> >       "ubsan_type_mismatch_common",
> >       "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch",
> > --
> > 2.35.1.1021.g381101b075-goog
> >
>


-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
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  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-14 15:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-29 12:39 [PATCH v2 00/48] Add KernelMemorySanitizer infrastructure Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 01/48] x86: add missing include to sparsemem.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 02/48] stackdepot: reserve 5 extra bits in depot_stack_handle_t Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 03/48] kasan: common: adapt to the new prototype of __stack_depot_save() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 04/48] instrumented.h: allow instrumenting both sides of copy_from_user() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 05/48] x86: asm: instrument usercopy in get_user() and __put_user_size() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 06/48] asm-generic: instrument usercopy in cacheflush.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 07/48] kmsan: add ReST documentation Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 08/48] kmsan: introduce __no_sanitize_memory and __no_kmsan_checks Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 09/48] kmsan: mark noinstr as __no_sanitize_memory Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 10/48] x86: kmsan: pgtable: reduce vmalloc space Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 11/48] libnvdimm/pfn_dev: increase MAX_STRUCT_PAGE_SIZE Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 12/48] kcsan: clang: retire CONFIG_KCSAN_KCOV_BROKEN Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-30  6:00   ` Marco Elver
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 13/48] kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-30  8:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-03-30  9:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-04 14:39   ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 14/48] kmsan: implement kmsan_init(), initialize READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 15/48] kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported common kernel code Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 16/48] MAINTAINERS: add entry for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 17/48] kmsan: mm: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 18/48] kmsan: mm: call KMSAN hooks from SLUB code Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 19/48] kmsan: handle task creation and exiting Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 20/48] kmsan: init: call KMSAN initialization routines Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 21/48] instrumented.h: add KMSAN support Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 22/48] kmsan: unpoison @tlb in arch_tlb_gather_mmu() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 23/48] kmsan: add iomap support Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 24/48] Input: libps2: mark data received in __ps2_command() as initialized Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 25/48] kmsan: dma: unpoison DMA mappings Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 26/48] kmsan: virtio: check/unpoison scatterlist in vring_map_one_sg() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 27/48] kmsan: handle memory sent to/from USB Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 28/48] kmsan: instrumentation.h: add instrumentation_begin_with_regs() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 29/48] kmsan: entry: handle register passing from uninstrumented code Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:39 ` [PATCH v2 30/48] kmsan: add tests for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 31/48] kernel: kmsan: don't instrument stacktrace.c Alexander Potapenko
2022-04-04 14:56   ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 32/48] kmsan: disable strscpy() optimization under KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 33/48] crypto: kmsan: disable accelerated configs " Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 34/48] kmsan: disable physical page merging in biovec Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 35/48] kmsan: block: skip bio block merging logic for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 36/48] kmsan: kcov: unpoison area->list in kcov_remote_area_put() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 37/48] security: kmsan: fix interoperability with auto-initialization Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 38/48] objtool: kmsan: list KMSAN API functions as uaccess-safe Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-30  8:46   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-04-14 15:30     ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2022-04-14 15:38       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 39/48] x86: kmsan: make READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK() return initialized values Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 40/48] x86: kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported code Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 41/48] x86: kmsan: skip shadow checks in __switch_to() Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 42/48] x86: kmsan: handle open-coded assembly in lib/iomem.c Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 43/48] x86: kmsan: use __msan_ string functions where possible Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 44/48] x86: kmsan: sync metadata pages on page fault Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 45/48] x86: kasan: kmsan: support CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM on x86, enable it for KASAN/KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 46/48] x86: fs: kmsan: disable CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 47/48] x86: kmsan: handle register passing from uninstrumented code Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-29 12:40 ` [PATCH v2 48/48] x86: kmsan: enable KMSAN builds for x86 Alexander Potapenko

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