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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	 Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	 Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	 Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: security: introduce CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 19:04:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=UMww4b8+NuBZ82pq4DS19tQx=h_3E6C2s3fkLLGD7fMg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG_fn=XW=-=SiAjToBNGDBdr1iZFA-9Ri_a4tF40448yPTbU4w@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 1:03 PM Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 6:30 PM Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 16 Apr 2019, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> >
> > > > Hmmm... But we already have debugging options that poison objects and
> > > > pages?
> > > Laura Abbott mentioned in one of the previous threads
> > > (https://marc.info/?l=kernel-hardening&m=155474181528491&w=2) that:
> > >
> > > """
> > > I've looked at doing something similar in the past (failing to find
> > > the thread this morning...) and while this will work, it has pretty
> > > serious performance issues. It's not actually the poisoning which
> > > is expensive but that turning on debugging removes the cpu slab
> > > which has significant performance penalties.
> >
> > Ok you could rework that logic to be able to keep the per cpu slabs?
> I'll look into that. There's a lot going on with checking those
> poisoned bytes, although we don't need that for hardening.
>
> What do you think about the proposed approach to page initialization?
> We could separate that part from slab poisoning.
>
> > Also if you do the zeroing then you need to do it in the hotpath. And this
> > patch introduces new instructions to that hotpath for checking and
> > executing the zeroing.
> Right now the patch doesn't slow down the default case when
> CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL=n, as GFP_INIT_ALWAYS_ON is 0.
> In the case heap initialization is enabled we could probably omit the
> gfp_flags check, as it'll be always zero in the case there's a
> constructor or RCU flag is set.
> So we'll have two branches instead of one in the case CONFIG_INIT_HEAP_ALL=y.
>
Ok, I think we could do the same without extra branches.
Right now I'm working on a patch that uses static branches in the
function that checks GFP flags:

static inline bool want_init_memory(gfp_t flags)
{
        if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_allocations))
                return true;
        return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
}

and does the following in slab_alloc_node():

        if (unlikely(want_init_memory(gfpflags)) && object)
                s->poison_fn(s, object);
, where s->poison_fn is either memset(object, 0, s->object_size) for
normal SLAB caches or a no-op for SLAB caches that have ctors
(I _think_ I don't have to special-case SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU).

With init_allocations disabled this doesn't affect the kernel
performance (hackbench shows negative slowdown within the standard
deviation). Most certainly the indirect call is performed not too
often.
With init_allocations enabled this yields ~7% slowdown on hackbench. I
believe most of that is caused by double initialization, which we can
eliminate by passing an extra GFP flag to the page allocator.

>
> --
> Alexander Potapenko
> Software Engineer
>
> Google Germany GmbH
> Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
> 80636 München
>
> Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
> Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
> Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg



-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg


      reply	other threads:[~2019-04-17 17:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-12 12:45 Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-12 14:16 ` Qian Cai
2019-04-12 15:23   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-16  2:02 ` Andrew Morton
2019-04-16  8:33   ` Vlastimil Babka
2019-04-16 12:21   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-16  8:30 ` Vlastimil Babka
2019-04-16 12:04   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-16 15:32 ` Christopher Lameter
2019-04-16 16:01   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-16 16:30     ` Christopher Lameter
2019-04-17 11:03       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-17 17:04         ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]

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