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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 16:21:56 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLF8WTQDEh+-M7_8pZUCEG0FVw1e1PS7Ew4EBy+hXdD_w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1450755641-7856-6-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name>

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> wrote:
>
> Sanitization is useful for security but comes at the cost of performance
> in clearing on free. Mark select caches as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE so
> sanitization will not happen under the default configuration. The

Can you describe why these were selected?

> kernel may be booted with the proper command line option to allow these
> caches to be sanitized.

Might be good to specifically mention the command line used to
sanitize even these caches.

-Kees

>
> All credit for the original work should be given to Brad Spengler and
> the PaX Team.
>
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
> ---
> This is the initial set of excludes that the grsecurity patches had.
> More may need to be added/removed as the series is tested.
> ---
>  fs/buffer.c       |  2 +-
>  fs/dcache.c       |  2 +-
>  kernel/fork.c     |  2 +-
>  mm/rmap.c         |  4 ++--
>  mm/slab.h         |  2 +-
>  net/core/skbuff.c | 16 ++++++++--------
>  6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c
> index 4f4cd95..f19e4ab 100644
> --- a/fs/buffer.c
> +++ b/fs/buffer.c
> @@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@ void __init buffer_init(void)
>         bh_cachep = kmem_cache_create("buffer_head",
>                         sizeof(struct buffer_head), 0,
>                                 (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|
> -                               SLAB_MEM_SPREAD),
> +                               SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_NO_SANITIZE),
>                                 NULL);
>
>         /*
> diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
> index 5c33aeb..470f6be 100644
> --- a/fs/dcache.c
> +++ b/fs/dcache.c
> @@ -3451,7 +3451,7 @@ void __init vfs_caches_init_early(void)
>  void __init vfs_caches_init(void)
>  {
>         names_cachep = kmem_cache_create("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
> -                       SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> +                       SLAB_NO_SANITIZE|SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>
>         dcache_init();
>         inode_init();
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index fce002e..35db9c3 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1868,7 +1868,7 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void)
>         mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create("mm_struct",
>                         sizeof(struct mm_struct), ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
>                         SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK, NULL);
> -       vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC);
> +       vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_SANITIZE);
>         mmap_init();
>         nsproxy_cache_init();
>  }
> diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
> index b577fbb..74296d9 100644
> --- a/mm/rmap.c
> +++ b/mm/rmap.c
> @@ -428,8 +428,8 @@ static void anon_vma_ctor(void *data)
>  void __init anon_vma_init(void)
>  {
>         anon_vma_cachep = kmem_cache_create("anon_vma", sizeof(struct anon_vma),
> -                       0, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC, anon_vma_ctor);
> -       anon_vma_chain_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(anon_vma_chain, SLAB_PANIC);
> +               0, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_SANITIZE, anon_vma_ctor);
> +       anon_vma_chain_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(anon_vma_chain, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_SANITIZE);
>  }
>
>  /*
> diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
> index b54b636..6de99da 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.h
> +++ b/mm/slab.h
> @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kmem_cache_flags(unsigned long object_size,
>
>  /* Legal flag mask for kmem_cache_create(), for various configurations */
>  #define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | SLAB_PANIC | \
> -                        SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS )
> +                        SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS | SLAB_NO_SANITIZE)
>
>  #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB)
>  #define SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER)
> diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
> index b2df375..1d499ea 100644
> --- a/net/core/skbuff.c
> +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
> @@ -3316,15 +3316,15 @@ done:
>  void __init skb_init(void)
>  {
>         skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_head_cache",
> -                                             sizeof(struct sk_buff),
> -                                             0,
> -                                             SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
> -                                             NULL);
> +                               sizeof(struct sk_buff),
> +                               0,
> +                               SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_SANITIZE,
> +                               NULL);
>         skbuff_fclone_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_fclone_cache",
> -                                               sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
> -                                               0,
> -                                               SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
> -                                               NULL);
> +                               sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
> +                               0,
> +                               SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_SANITIZE,
> +                               NULL);
>  }
>
>  /**
> --
> 2.5.0
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-06  0:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-22  3:40 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48   ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06  0:17     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:06       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:21   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-01-06  2:11     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  9:33   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37       ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18         ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06           ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25     ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22       ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28           ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08             ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19               ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13                 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32                   ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06  0:29                   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:46                     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:15   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:49     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38   ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:09     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  3:17       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08  1:23           ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14  3:49               ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39                   ` Christoph Lameter

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