From: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Reid Kleckner <rnk@google.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Subject: Re: binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE breaks asan
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 11:52:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKj0M55wK=0WE_uKJpiJ031J5jPVAZR-VA7_O2qJUi=BQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1502131739.1803.12.camel@gmail.com>
On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 11:48 AM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-08-07 at 11:39 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 11:26 AM, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
>> wrote:
>> > +eugenis@ for msan
>> >
>> > On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 10:33 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
>> > wrote:
>> > >
>> > > On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 10:24 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com
>> > > > wrote:
>> > > > The recent "binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE" patch:
>> > > >
>> > > > https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eab09532d40090698b05a07
>> > > > c1c87f39fdbc5fab5
>> > > > breaks user-space AddressSanitizer. AddressSanitizer makes
>> > > > assumptions
>> > > > about address space layout for substantial performance gains.
>> > > > There
>> > > > are multiple people complaining about this already:
>> > > > https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/837
>> > > > https://twitter.com/kayseesee/status/894594085608013825
>> > > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196537
>> > > > AddressSanitizer maps shadow memory at [0x00007fff7000-
>> > > > 0x10007fff7fff]
>> > > > expecting that non-pie binaries will be below 2GB and pie
>> > > > binaries/modules will be at 0x55 or 0x7f. This is not the first
>> > > > time
>> > > > kernel address space shuffling breaks sanitizers. The last one
>> > > > was the
>> > > > move to 0x55.
>> > >
>> > > What are the requirements for 32-bit and 64-bit memory layouts for
>> > > ASan currently, so we can adjust the ET_DYN base to work with
>> > > existing
>> > > ASan?
>> >
>> >
>> > 32-bit asan shadow is 0x20000000 - 0x40000000
>> >
>> > % clang -fsanitize=address dummy.c -m32 && ASAN_OPTIONS=verbosity=1
>> > ./a.out
>> > 2>&1 | grep '||'
>> > > > `[0x40000000, 0xffffffff]` || HighMem ||
>> > > > `[0x28000000, 0x3fffffff]` || HighShadow ||
>> > > > `[0x24000000, 0x27ffffff]` || ShadowGap ||
>> > > > `[0x20000000, 0x23ffffff]` || LowShadow ||
>> > > > `[0x00000000, 0x1fffffff]` || LowMem ||
>> >
>> > %
>>
>> For 32-bit, it looks like the new PIE base is fine, yes? 0x000400000UL
>
> Need to consider the ASLR shift which is up to 1M with a default kernel
> configuration but up to 256M with the maximum configurable entropy.
>
> On 64-bit, it's a lot larger... and the goal is also tying the stack
> base to that so that's a further significant change, increasing the
> address space used when the maximum configurable entropy is used.
We've got two things to do upstream:
- fix the default kernel for ASan
- maximize the entropy optionally
I.e. the first is a userspace regression that needs to be fixed for
existing ASan user. The second is developing a future path to
maximizing the non-default entropy, for which new versions of *San
would want to detect and use.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-07 18:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-07 17:24 Dmitry Vyukov
2017-08-07 17:33 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 17:33 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 18:26 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 18:36 ` Evgenii Stepanov
2017-08-07 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 18:51 ` Evgenii Stepanov
2017-08-07 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:03 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:10 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:32 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:12 ` Evgenii Stepanov
2017-08-07 18:38 ` Daniel Micay
2017-08-07 18:45 ` Daniel Micay
2017-08-07 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 18:48 ` Daniel Micay
2017-08-07 18:52 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-08-07 18:56 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:01 ` Daniel Micay
2017-08-07 19:05 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:16 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:21 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:26 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 19:40 ` Kostya Serebryany
2017-08-07 19:42 ` Daniel Micay
2017-08-07 19:46 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 18:21 ` Daniel Micay
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