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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 16:15:35 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKZTg9jfg9CtXxjDOO_DDBW=c5iyLtkfJr7zAqzxWgQ4Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1450755641-7856-8-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name>

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> wrote:
>
> In a similar manner to WRITE_AFTER_FREE, add a READ_AFTER_FREE
> test to test free poisoning features. Sample output when
> no poison is present:
>
> [   20.222501] lkdtm: Performing direct entry READ_AFTER_FREE
> [   20.226163] lkdtm: Freed val: 12345678
>
> with poison:
>
> [   24.203748] lkdtm: Performing direct entry READ_AFTER_FREE
> [   24.207261] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [   24.208193] Modules linked in:
> [   24.208193] CPU: 0 PID: 866 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.4.0-rc5-work+ #108
>
> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
> ---
>  drivers/misc/lkdtm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
> index 11fdadc..c641fb7 100644
> --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
> +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ enum ctype {
>         CT_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE,
>         CT_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION,
>         CT_WRITE_AFTER_FREE,
> +       CT_READ_AFTER_FREE,
>         CT_SOFTLOCKUP,
>         CT_HARDLOCKUP,
>         CT_SPINLOCKUP,
> @@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ static char* cp_type[] = {
>         "UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE",
>         "OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION",
>         "WRITE_AFTER_FREE",
> +       "READ_AFTER_FREE",
>         "SOFTLOCKUP",
>         "HARDLOCKUP",
>         "SPINLOCKUP",
> @@ -417,6 +419,33 @@ static void lkdtm_do_action(enum ctype which)
>                 memset(data, 0x78, len);
>                 break;
>         }
> +       case CT_READ_AFTER_FREE: {
> +               int **base;
> +               int *val, *tmp;
> +
> +               base = kmalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);
> +               if (!base)
> +                       return;
> +
> +               val = kmalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);
> +               if (!val)
> +                       return;

For both of these test failure return, I think there should be a
pr_warn too (see CT_EXEC_USERSPACE).

> +
> +               *val = 0x12345678;
> +
> +               /*
> +                * Don't just use the first entry since that's where the
> +                * freelist goes for the slab allocator
> +                */
> +               base[1] = val;

Maybe just aim at the middle, in case allocator freelist tracking ever
grows? base[1024/sizeof(int)/2] or something?

> +               kfree(base);
> +
> +               tmp = base[1];
> +               pr_info("Freed val: %x\n", *tmp);

Instead of depending on the deref to fail, maybe just use a simple
BUG_ON to test that the value did actually change? Or, change the
pr_info to "Failed to Oops when reading freed value: ..." just to be
slightly more verbose about what failed?

> +
> +               kfree(val);
> +               break;
> +       }
>         case CT_SOFTLOCKUP:
>                 preempt_disable();
>                 for (;;)
> --
> 2.5.0
>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-06  0:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-22  3:40 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48   ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06  0:17     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:06       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:21   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:11     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  9:33   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37       ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18         ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06           ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25     ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22       ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28           ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08             ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19               ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13                 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32                   ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06  0:29                   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:46                     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:15   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-01-06  2:49     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38   ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:09     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  3:17       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08  1:23           ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14  3:49               ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39                   ` Christoph Lameter

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