Re: [PATCH v2] KASAN: prohibit KASAN+STRUCTLEAK combination

[Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>]

On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote:
> Currently STRUCTLEAK inserts initialization out of live scope of
> variables from KASAN point of view. This leads to KASAN false
> positive reports. Prohibit this combination for now.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
> Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>

This seems fine until we have a better solution. Thanks!

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

>
> ---
>
> This combination leads to periodic confusion
> and pointless debugging:
>
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151991367323082
> https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151992229326243
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/30/33
>
> Changes since v1:
>  - replace KASAN with KASAN_EXTRA
>    Only KASAN_EXTRA enables variable scope checking
> ---
>  arch/Kconfig | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index 8e0d665c8d53..75dd23acf133 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -464,6 +464,10 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
>  config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
>         bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses"
>         depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> +       # Currently STRUCTLEAK inserts initialization out of live scope of
> +       # variables from KASAN point of view. This leads to KASAN false
> +       # positive reports. Prohibit this combination for now.
> +       depends on !KASAN_EXTRA
>         help
>           This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a
>           __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information
> --
> 2.17.0.484.g0c8726318c-goog
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security