From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usercopy: Skip multi-page bounds checking on SLOB
Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2016 13:03:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJi4qMD5p38i5NuR7fh38m7mp+7qZNXgUiGNRTaLtYoxA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFyiAOSM=ubzfOtdMx6e6vAmDS4JYW4sUU-5sQKPPzWBdQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 12:41 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> When an allocator does not mark all allocations as PageSlab, or does not
>> mark multipage allocations with __GFP_COMP, hardened usercopy cannot
>> correctly validate the allocation. SLOB lacks this, so short-circuit
>> the checking for the allocators that aren't marked with
>> CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR. This also updates the config
>> help and corrects a typo in the usercopy comments.
>
> I think I'm going to instead do just this:
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index df28f2b6f3e1..da10d9b573a4 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
> config HARDENED_USERCOPY
> bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
> depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
> + depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
> select BUG
> help
> This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
>
> which basically disables the hardened usercopy for SLOB systems.
> Nobody cares, because nobody should use SLOB anyway, and certainly
> wouldn't use it with hardening.
Okay, I can live with that. I'd hoped to keep the general split
between the other checks (i.e. stack) and the allocator, but if this
is preferred, that's cool. :)
> Let's see if we get any other warnings with that..
Another report came back on NFS root, but it didn't stop the system
from booting, and may be a legit memory exposure report. I'm still
investigating that.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-19 20:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-17 22:29 Kees Cook
2016-08-18 14:21 ` Rik van Riel
2016-08-18 17:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-18 18:02 ` Rik van Riel
2016-08-19 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-19 10:31 ` Michal Hocko
2016-08-19 19:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-08-19 20:03 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-08-19 20:07 ` Linus Torvalds
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