From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Speed up SLUB poisoning + disable checks
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 13:06:35 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJK1UhNX7h2YmxxTrCABr8oS=Y2OBLMr4KTxk7LctRaiQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56B24B01.30306@redhat.com>
On Wed, Feb 3, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 01/25/2016 11:03 PM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 05:15:10PM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Based on the discussion from the series to add slab sanitization
>>> (lkml.kernel.org/g/<1450755641-7856-1-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name>)
>>> the existing SLAB_POISON mechanism already covers similar behavior.
>>> The performance of SLAB_POISON isn't very good. With hackbench -g 20 -l
>>> 1000
>>> on QEMU with one cpu:
>>
>>
>> I doesn't follow up that discussion, but, I think that reusing
>> SLAB_POISON for slab sanitization needs more changes. I assume that
>> completeness and performance is matter for slab sanitization.
>>
>> 1) SLAB_POISON isn't applied to specific kmem_cache which has
>> constructor or SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag. For debug, it's not necessary
>> to be applied, but, for slab sanitization, it is better to apply it to
>> all caches.
>
>
> The grsecurity patches get around this by calling the constructor again
> after poisoning. It could be worth investigating doing that as well
> although my focus was on the cases without the constructor.
>>
>>
>> 2) SLAB_POISON makes object size bigger so natural alignment will be
>> broken. For example, kmalloc(256) cache's size is 256 in normal
>> case but it would be 264 when SLAB_POISON is enabled. This causes
>> memory waste.
>
>
> The grsecurity patches also bump the size up to put the free pointer
> outside the object. For sanitization purposes it is cleaner to have
> no pointers in the object after free
>
>>
>> In fact, I'd prefer not reusing SLAB_POISON. It would make thing
>> simpler. But, it's up to Christoph.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>
> It basically looks like trying to poison on the fast path at all
> will have a negative impact even with the feature is turned off.
> Christoph has indicated this is not acceptable so we are forced
> to limit it to the slow path only if we want runtime enablement.
Is it possible to have both? i.e fast path via CONFIG, and slow path
via runtime options?
> If we're limited to the slow path only, we might as well work
> with SLAB_POISON to make it faster. We can reevaluate if it turns
> out the poisoning isn't fast enough to be useful.
And since I'm new to this area, I know of fast/slow path in the
syscall sense. What happens in the allocation/free fast/slow path that
makes it fast or slow?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-02-03 21:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-26 1:15 Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 1:15 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/3] slub: Drop lock at the end of free_debug_processing Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 16:19 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-26 1:15 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/3] slub: Don't limit debugging to slow paths Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 8:48 ` Paul Bolle
2016-01-26 1:15 ` [PATCH 3/3] slub: Add option to skip consistency checks Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 15:00 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-26 7:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Speed up SLUB poisoning + disable checks Joonsoo Kim
2016-01-26 15:01 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-26 15:21 ` Joonsoo Kim
2016-02-03 18:46 ` Laura Abbott
2016-02-03 21:06 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-02-03 21:35 ` Laura Abbott
2016-02-03 23:02 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-02-04 0:46 ` Laura Abbott
2016-02-04 3:23 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-26 14:57 ` Christoph Lameter
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