From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 16:19:16 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ1E3RixM1htvp9FB0Uvnd4-dCPyqisvVk5btt=AC=X8g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1450755641-7856-2-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name>
On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 7:40 PM, Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> wrote:
>
> Each of the different allocators (SLAB/SLUB/SLOB) handles
> clearing of objects differently depending on configuration.
> Add common infrastructure for selecting sanitization levels
> (off, slow path only, partial, full) and marking caches as
> appropriate.
>
> All credit for the original work should be given to Brad Spengler and
> the PaX Team.
>
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
> ---
> include/linux/slab.h | 7 +++++++
> include/linux/slab_def.h | 4 ++++
> mm/slab.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/slab_common.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 2037a86..35c1e2d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,13 @@
> #define SLAB_DEBUG_FREE 0x00000100UL /* DEBUG: Perform (expensive) checks on free */
> #define SLAB_RED_ZONE 0x00000400UL /* DEBUG: Red zone objs in a cache */
> #define SLAB_POISON 0x00000800UL /* DEBUG: Poison objects */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
> +#define SLAB_NO_SANITIZE 0x00001000UL /* Do not sanitize objs on free */
> +#else
> +#define SLAB_NO_SANITIZE 0x00000000UL
> +#endif
> +
> #define SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN 0x00002000UL /* Align objs on cache lines */
> #define SLAB_CACHE_DMA 0x00004000UL /* Use GFP_DMA memory */
> #define SLAB_STORE_USER 0x00010000UL /* DEBUG: Store the last owner for bug hunting */
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab_def.h b/include/linux/slab_def.h
> index 33d0490..4c3fb93 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab_def.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab_def.h
> @@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct kmem_cache {
> */
> int obj_offset;
> #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
> + atomic_t sanitized;
> + atomic_t not_sanitized;
> +#endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
> struct memcg_cache_params memcg_params;
> #endif
> diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
> index 7b60871..b54b636 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.h
> +++ b/mm/slab.h
> @@ -66,6 +66,28 @@ extern struct list_head slab_caches;
> /* The slab cache that manages slab cache information */
> extern struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +#define SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE_VALUE '\xfe'
> +#else
> +#define SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE_VALUE '\xff'
> +#endif
> +enum slab_sanitize_mode {
> + /* No sanitization */
> + SLAB_SANITIZE_OFF = 0,
> +
> + /* Partial sanitization happens only on the slow path */
> + SLAB_SANITIZE_PARTIAL_SLOWPATH = 1,
> +
> + /* Partial sanitization happens everywhere */
> + SLAB_SANITIZE_PARTIAL = 2,
> +
> + /* Sanitization happens on all slabs, all paths */
> + SLAB_SANITIZE_FULL = 3,
> +};
> +extern enum slab_sanitize_mode sanitize_slab;
> +#endif
> +
> unsigned long calculate_alignment(unsigned long flags,
> unsigned long align, unsigned long size);
>
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index 3c6a86b..4b28f70 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,42 @@ LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
> DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
> struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
> +enum slab_sanitize_mode sanitize_slab = SLAB_SANITIZE_PARTIAL;
> +static int __init sanitize_slab_setup(char *str)
> +{
> + if (!str)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!strcmp(str, "0") || !strcmp(str, "off")) {
> + pr_info("slab sanitization disabled");
> + sanitize_slab = SLAB_SANITIZE_OFF;
> + } else if (!strcmp(str, "1") || !strcmp(str, "slow")) {
> + pr_info("slab sanitization partial slow path");
> + sanitize_slab = SLAB_SANITIZE_PARTIAL_SLOWPATH;
> + } else if (!strcmp(str, "2") || !strcmp(str, "partial")) {
> + pr_info("slab sanitization partial");
> + sanitize_slab = SLAB_SANITIZE_PARTIAL;
> + } else if (!strcmp(str, "3") || !strcmp(str, "full")) {
> + pr_info("slab sanitization full");
> + sanitize_slab = SLAB_SANITIZE_FULL;
> + } else
> + pr_err("slab sanitization: unsupported option '%s'\n", str);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("sanitize_slab", sanitize_slab_setup);
Bike shedding: maybe "slab_sanitize" word order to match
"slab_nomerge", "slab_max_order", "slub_debug", etc?
> +
> +static inline bool sanitize_mergeable(unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + return (sanitize_slab == SLAB_SANITIZE_OFF) || (flags & SLAB_NO_SANITIZE);
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline bool sanitize_mergeable(unsigned long flags) { return true; }
> +#endif
> +
> +
> /*
> * Set of flags that will prevent slab merging
> */
> @@ -227,6 +263,9 @@ static inline void destroy_memcg_params(struct kmem_cache *s)
> */
> int slab_unmergeable(struct kmem_cache *s)
> {
> + if (!sanitize_mergeable(s->flags))
> + return 1;
> +
> if (slab_nomerge || (s->flags & SLAB_NEVER_MERGE))
> return 1;
>
> @@ -250,6 +289,9 @@ struct kmem_cache *find_mergeable(size_t size, size_t align,
> {
> struct kmem_cache *s;
>
> + if (!sanitize_mergeable(flags))
> + return NULL;
> +
> if (slab_nomerge || (flags & SLAB_NEVER_MERGE))
> return NULL;
>
> @@ -407,6 +449,13 @@ kmem_cache_create(const char *name, size_t size, size_t align,
> */
> flags &= CACHE_CREATE_MASK;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
> + if (sanitize_slab == SLAB_SANITIZE_OFF || (flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
> + flags |= SLAB_NO_SANITIZE;
> + else if (sanitize_slab == SLAB_SANITIZE_FULL)
> + flags &= ~SLAB_NO_SANITIZE;
> +#endif
> +
> s = __kmem_cache_alias(name, size, align, flags, ctor);
> if (s)
> goto out_unlock;
> @@ -1050,6 +1099,10 @@ static void print_slabinfo_header(struct seq_file *m)
> "<error> <maxfreeable> <nodeallocs> <remotefrees> <alienoverflow>");
> seq_puts(m, " : cpustat <allochit> <allocmiss> <freehit> <freemiss>");
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
> + seq_puts(m, " : sanitization <sanitized> <not_sanitized>");
> +#endif
> +
> seq_putc(m, '\n');
> }
>
> --
> 2.5.0
>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-06 0:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-22 3:40 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48 ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06 0:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:19 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:21 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:11 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 9:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06 0:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:46 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:49 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38 ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 3:17 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 1:23 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14 3:49 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 3:35 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39 ` Christoph Lameter
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