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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
	Boris Lukashev <blukashev@sempervictus.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory)
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 11:29:21 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+RRiZtYfO-4Peh=FAHmUS4FThKHp-djoFgY80rebKTxQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2f23544a-bd24-1e71-967b-e8d1cf5a20a3@redhat.com>

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 02/13/2018 01:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger
>>> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING
>>> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are
>>> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well.
>>
>>
>> Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the
>> arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :(
>>
>> -Kees
>>
>
> (adding linux-arm-kernel and changing the subject)
>
> Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be
> fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past

I think that's a pretty serious problem: we can't have aliases with
mismatched permissions; this degrades a deterministic protection
(read-only) to a probabilistic protection (knowing where the alias of
a target is mapped). Having an attack be "needs some info leaks"
instead of "need execution control to change perms" is a much lower
bar, IMO.

> experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes
> at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically
> add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but
> I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance
> is very poor at that point.

Why does using finer granularity on the physmap degrade performance? I
assume TLB pressure, but what is heavily using that area? (I must not
be understanding what physmap actually gets used for -- I thought it
was just a convenience to have a 1:1 virt/phys map for some lookups?)

-Kees


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-14 19:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-24 17:56 [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:10   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2018-01-25 11:59     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-25 15:14       ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-25 15:38         ` Jerome Glisse
2018-01-26 12:28           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 16:36             ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-30 13:46               ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26  5:35     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-26 11:46       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02 18:39       ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-03 15:38         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:57           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 20:12             ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-03 20:32               ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 22:29                 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-04 15:05                   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:27                     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13  0:40                       ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13  1:25                         ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13  3:39                           ` Jann Horn
2018-02-13 16:09                             ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13 21:43                               ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:06                                 ` arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory) Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:28                                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-14 20:13                                     ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:29                                   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-02-14 19:35                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:28                                     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:22                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:48                                   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 22:13                                     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-14 22:27                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13 15:20                         ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-02-13 15:20                         ` Igor Stoppa
     [not found]                         ` <5a83024c.64369d0a.a1e94.cdd6SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2018-02-13 18:10                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2018-02-20 17:16                             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:37                               ` Kees Cook
2018-02-05 15:40           ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-09 11:17             ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 19:41   ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:14   ` Ralph Campbell
2018-01-25  7:53     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa

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