From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 16:09:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+9dpdMnjQWRGhogMwA+2K2HOF8_g8-ngHr=vf3r59XsQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170620042936.GD610@zzz.localdomain>
On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 9:29 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 04:36:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Some hardened environments want to build kernels with slab_nomerge
>> already set (so that they do not depend on remembering to set the kernel
>> command line option). This is desired to reduce the risk of kernel heap
>> overflows being able to overwrite objects from merged caches, increasing
>> the difficulty of these attacks. By keeping caches unmerged, these kinds
>> of exploits can usually only damage objects in the same cache (though the
>> risk to metadata exploitation is unchanged).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> mm/slab_common.c | 5 ++---
>> security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
>> index 6c14d765379f..17a4c4b33283 100644
>> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
>> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
>> @@ -47,13 +47,12 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
>>
>> /*
>> * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
>> - * (Could be removed. This was introduced to pacify the merge skeptics.)
>> */
>> -static int slab_nomerge;
>> +static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
>>
>> static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
>> {
>> - slab_nomerge = 1;
>> + slab_nomerge = true;
>> return 1;
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>> index 0c181cebdb8a..e40bd2a260f8 100644
>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>> @@ -166,6 +166,19 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
>> confined to a separate cache, attackers must find other ways
>> to prepare heap attacks that will be near their desired target.
>>
>> +config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
>> + bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
>> + default y
>> + help
>> + For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
>> + merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
>> + This carries a small risk of kernel heap overflows being able
>> + to overwrite objects from merged caches, which reduces the
>> + difficulty of such heap attacks. By keeping caches unmerged,
>> + these kinds of exploits can usually only damage objects in the
>> + same cache. To disable merging at runtime, "slab_nomerge" can be
>> + passed on the kernel command line.
>> +
>
> It's good to at least have this option, but again it's logically separate and
> shouldn't just be hidden in patch 23/23. And again, is it really just about
> heap overflows?
>
> Please also fix the documentation for slab_nomerge in
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt.
I've split it out and updated the docs, thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-20 23:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-19 23:36 [PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 01/23] usercopy: Prepare for " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 02/23] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 03/23] vfs: define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 04/23] vfs: copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 06/23] cifs: define usercopy region in cifs_request " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 07/23] exofs: define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 08/23] ext2: define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 09/23] ext4: define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 10/23] vxfs: define usercopy region in vxfs_inode " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 11/23] jfs: define usercopy region in jfs_ip " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 12/23] orangefs: define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 13/23] ufs: define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 14/23] fork: define usercopy region in thread_stack, task_struct, mm_struct slab caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 15/23] net: define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 16/23] net: copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-06-20 4:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-28 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 16:55 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 18/23] scsi: define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 19/23] xfs: define usercopy region in xfs_inode " Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 20/23] usercopy: convert kmalloc caches to usercopy caches Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 21/23] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 Kees Cook
2017-06-20 4:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-28 17:03 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches Kees Cook
2017-06-20 4:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-20 4:47 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20 22:27 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:24 ` Laura Abbott
2017-06-20 22:22 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 7:31 ` Michal Hocko
2017-06-27 22:07 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-28 8:54 ` Michal Hocko
2017-06-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time Kees Cook
2017-06-20 4:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-06-20 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 4:29 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-20 23:09 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-06-20 19:41 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting Rik van Riel
2017-10-20 22:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-21 3:04 ` Kees Cook
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