From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] slab: Add POISON_POINTER_DELTA to ZERO_SIZE_PTR
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 09:37:37 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+3pD7Ss_PBY9H_A6B5-Ers2wYqFJ1y4iryKzqc=jCxXg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1479207422-6535-1-git-send-email-mpe@ellerman.id.au>
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 2:57 AM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> wrote:
> POISON_POINTER_DELTA is defined in poison.h, and is intended to be used
> to shift poison values so that they don't alias userspace.
>
> We should add it to ZERO_SIZE_PTR so that attackers can't use
> ZERO_SIZE_PTR as a way to get a pointer to userspace.
Ah, when dealing with a 0-sized malloc or similar? Do you have
pointers to exploits that rely on this?
Regardless, normally PAN/SMAP-like things should be sufficient to
protect against this. Additionally, on everything but x86_64 and
arm64, POISON_POINTER_DELTA == 0, if I'm reading correctly:
#ifdef CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
# define POISON_POINTER_DELTA _AC(CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE, UL)
#else
# define POISON_POINTER_DELTA 0
#endif
...
config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
hex
default 0 if X86_32
default 0xdead000000000000 if X86_64
...
config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
hex
default 0xdead000000000000
Is the plan to add ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE for powerpc too? And either
way, this patch, IIUC, will break the ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check, since
suddenly all of userspace will match it. (Though maybe that's okay?)
-Kees
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
> ---
> include/linux/slab.h | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 084b12bad198..17ddd7aea2dd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> #define _LINUX_SLAB_H
>
> #include <linux/gfp.h>
> +#include <linux/poison.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>
> @@ -109,7 +110,7 @@
> * ZERO_SIZE_PTR can be passed to kfree though in the same way that NULL can.
> * Both make kfree a no-op.
> */
> -#define ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16)
> +#define ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)(16 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA))
>
> #define ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) <= \
> (unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
> --
> 2.7.4
>
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-15 17:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-15 10:57 Michael Ellerman
2016-11-15 17:37 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-11-15 23:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-11-16 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16 0:35 ` Balbir Singh
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