From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from psmtp.com (na3sys010amx179.postini.com [74.125.245.179]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with SMTP id AB3F16B007E for ; Mon, 27 Feb 2012 22:46:16 -0500 (EST) Received: by lahi5 with SMTP id i5so818131lah.25 for ; Mon, 27 Feb 2012 19:46:13 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20120227144602.07f5ec33.akpm@linux-foundation.org> References: <1329990365-23779-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com> <20120227144602.07f5ec33.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2012 12:46:13 +0900 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] tmpfs: security xattr setting on inode creation From: "Ware, Ryan R" Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Andrew Morton Cc: Hugh Dickins , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 7:46 AM, Andrew Morton wrote: > > On Fri, 24 Feb 2012 19:19:22 -0800 (PST) > Hugh Dickins wrote: > > > +/* > > + * Callback for security_inode_init_security() for acquiring xattrs. > > + */ > > +static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 const struct xattr *x= attr_array, > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 void *fs_info) > > +{ > > + =A0 =A0 struct shmem_inode_info *info =3D SHMEM_I(inode); > > + =A0 =A0 const struct xattr *xattr; > > + =A0 =A0 struct shmem_xattr *new_xattr; > > + =A0 =A0 size_t len; > > + > > + =A0 =A0 for (xattr =3D xattr_array; xattr->name !=3D NULL; xattr++) { > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 new_xattr =3D shmem_xattr_alloc(xattr->value, > > xattr->value_len); > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 if (!new_xattr) > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 return -ENOMEM; > > + > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 len =3D strlen(xattr->name) + 1; > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 new_xattr->name =3D kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PR= EFIX_LEN + len, > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 = =A0 =A0 GFP_KERNEL); > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 if (!new_xattr->name) { > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 kfree(new_xattr); > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 return -ENOMEM; > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 } > > + > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 memcpy(new_xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX= , > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN); > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 memcpy(new_xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFI= X_LEN, > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0xattr->name, len); > > + > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 spin_lock(&info->lock); > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 list_add(&new_xattr->list, &info->xattr_list)= ; > > + =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 spin_unlock(&info->lock); > > + =A0 =A0 } > > + > > + =A0 =A0 return 0; > > +} > > So if there's a kmalloc failure partway through the array, we leave a > partially xattrified inode in place. > > Are we sure this is OK? I'm guessing Jarkko can clean that up a bit. It wouldn't be a good idea to leave inaccurate data structures laying around during failure cases. Ryan -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Fight unfair telecom internet charges in Canada: sign http://stopthemeter.ca/ Don't email: email@kvack.org