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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: prevent a task from writing on its own /proc/*/mem
Date: Mon, 28 May 2018 11:06:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2N8tjyjGbdh+927uf2A_Xtsie=+DL+GZbvBniiO8jNHw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527346246-1334-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

On Sat, May 26, 2018 at 4:50 PM, Salvatore Mesoraca
<s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> wrote:
> Prevent a task from opening, in "write" mode, any /proc/*/mem
> file that operates on the task's mm.
> /proc/*/mem is mainly a debugging means and, as such, it shouldn't
> be used by the inspected process itself.
> Current implementation always allow a task to access its own
> /proc/*/mem file.
> A process can use it to overwrite read-only memory, making
> pointless the use of security_file_mprotect() or other ways to
> enforce RO memory.
>
> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c       | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
>  fs/proc/internal.h   |  3 ++-
>  fs/proc/task_mmu.c   |  4 ++--
>  fs/proc/task_nommu.c |  2 +-
>  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 1a76d75..01ecfec 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -762,8 +762,9 @@ static int proc_single_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>         .release        = single_release,
>  };
>
> -
> -struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
> +struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode,
> +                               unsigned int mode,
> +                               fmode_t f_mode)
>  {
>         struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
>         struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
> @@ -773,10 +774,20 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
>                 put_task_struct(task);
>
>                 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
> -                       /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
> -                       mmgrab(mm);
> -                       /* but do not pin its memory */
> -                       mmput(mm);
> +                       /*
> +                        * Prevent this interface from being used as a mean
> +                        * to bypass memory restrictions, including those
> +                        * imposed by LSMs.
> +                        */
> +                       if (mm == current->mm &&
> +                           f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> +                               mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
> +                       else {
> +                               /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
> +                               mmgrab(mm);
> +                               /* but do not pin its memory */
> +                               mmput(mm);
> +                       }
>                 }
>         }

I don't have an opinion on the overall patch, but this part looks
buggy: In the error path, you set `mm` to an error pointer, but you
still own the reference that mm_access() took on the old `mm`. The
error path needs to call `mmput(mm)`.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-28  9:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-26 14:50 Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 15:48 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-26 17:30   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-26 17:53     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-26 17:58     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2018-05-27  0:31 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-27  1:33   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-27 14:41     ` Kees Cook
2018-05-28  9:32     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2018-05-28  9:06 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2018-05-28  9:33   ` Salvatore Mesoraca

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