From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
syzbot <syzbot+f5d897f5194d92aa1769@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
david@kernel.org, harry.yoo@oracle.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
riel@surriel.com, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
vbabka@suse.cz
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [mm?] KCSAN: data-race in __anon_vma_prepare / __vmf_anon_prepare
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2026 19:23:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez28kdkX1imCj3rDYNTi9PKQBx9Cqf+N2Rg92o9BEdo9QA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <96aec792-7d10-4dfa-bf35-cc94300f4d2b@lucifer.local>
On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 7:02 PM Lorenzo Stoakes
<lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 06:48:37PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 6:29 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 6:06 PM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 14 Jan 2026 at 18:00, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 5:43 PM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote:
> > > > > > On Wed, 14 Jan 2026 at 17:32, syzbot
> > > > > > <syzbot+f5d897f5194d92aa1769@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > ==================================================================
> > > > > > > BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __anon_vma_prepare / __vmf_anon_prepare
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > write to 0xffff88811c751e80 of 8 bytes by task 13471 on cpu 1:
> > > > > > > __anon_vma_prepare+0x172/0x2f0 mm/rmap.c:212
> > > > > > > __vmf_anon_prepare+0x91/0x100 mm/memory.c:3673
> > > > > > > hugetlb_no_page+0x1c4/0x10d0 mm/hugetlb.c:5782
> > > > > > > hugetlb_fault+0x4cf/0xce0 mm/hugetlb.c:-1
> > > > > > > handle_mm_fault+0x1894/0x2c60 mm/memory.c:6578
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > > > read to 0xffff88811c751e80 of 8 bytes by task 13473 on cpu 0:
> > > > > > > __vmf_anon_prepare+0x26/0x100 mm/memory.c:3667
> > > > > > > hugetlb_no_page+0x1c4/0x10d0 mm/hugetlb.c:5782
> > > > > > > hugetlb_fault+0x4cf/0xce0 mm/hugetlb.c:-1
> > > > > > > handle_mm_fault+0x1894/0x2c60 mm/memory.c:6578
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffff888104ecca28
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> > > > > > > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13473 Comm: syz.2.3219 Tainted: G W syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(voluntary)
> > > > > > > Tainted: [W]=WARN
> > > > > > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
> > > > > > > ==================================================================
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Harry,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I see you've been debugging:
> > > > > > KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in folio_remove_rmap_ptes
> > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/694e3dc6.050a0220.35954c.0066.GAE@google.com/T/
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Can that bug be caused by this data race?
> > > > > > Below is an explanation by Gemini LLM as to why this race is harmful.
> > > > > > Obviously take it with a grain of salt, but with my limited mm
> > > > > > knowledge it does not look immediately wrong (re rmap invariant).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > However, now digging into details I see that this Lorenzo's patch
> > > > > > also marked as fixing "KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in
> > > > > > folio_remove_rmap_ptes":
> > > > > >
> > > > > > mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge
> > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/b7930ad2b1503a657e29fe928eb33061d7eadf5b.1767638272.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com/T/
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So perhaps the race is still benign (or points to another issue?)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Here is what LLM said about the race:
> > > > > > -----
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The bug report is actionable and points to a harmful data race in the Linux
> > > > > > kernel's memory management subsystem, specifically in the handling of
> > > > > > anonymous `hugetlb` mappings.
> > > > >
> > > > > This data race is not specific to hugetlb at all, and it isn't caused
> > > > > by any recent changes. It's a longstanding thing in core MM, but it's
> > > > > pretty benign as far as I know.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fundamentally, the field vma->anon_vma can be read while only holding
> > > > > the mmap lock in read mode; and it can concurrently be changed from
> > > > > NULL to non-NULL.
>
> Well isn't that what the page_table_lock is for...?
The page_table_lock prevents writer-writer data races, but not
reader-writer data races. (It is only held by writers, not by
readers.)
> > > > >
> > > > > One scenario to cause such a data race is to create a new anonymous
> > > > > VMA, then trigger two concurrent page faults inside this VMA. Assume a
> > > > > configuration with VMA locking disabled for simplicity, so that both
> > > > > faults happen under the mmap lock in read mode. This will lead to two
> > > > > concurrent calls to __vmf_anon_prepare()
> > > > > (https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.18.5/source/mm/memory.c#L3623),
> > > > > both threads only holding the mmap_lock in read mode.
> > > > > __vmf_anon_prepare() is essentially this (from
> > > > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.18.5/source/mm/memory.c#L3623,
> > > > > with VMA locking code removed):
> > > > >
> > > > > vm_fault_t __vmf_anon_prepare(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> > > > > {
> > > > > struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
> > > > > vm_fault_t ret = 0;
> > > > >
> > > > > if (likely(vma->anon_vma))
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > if (__anon_vma_prepare(vma))
> > > > > ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > return ret;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > int __anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > > > > {
> > > > > struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> > > > > struct anon_vma *anon_vma, *allocated;
> > > > > struct anon_vma_chain *avc;
> > > > >
> > > > > [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > [... allocate stuff ...]
> > > > >
> > > > > anon_vma_lock_write(anon_vma);
> > > > > /* page_table_lock to protect against threads */
> > > > > spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
> > > > > if (likely(!vma->anon_vma)) {
> > > > > vma->anon_vma = anon_vma;
> > > > > [...]
> > > > > }
> > > > > spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
> > > > > anon_vma_unlock_write(anon_vma);
> > > > >
> > > > > [... cleanup ...]
> > > > >
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > >
> > > > > [... error handling ...]
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > So if one thread reaches the "vma->anon_vma = anon_vma" assignment
> > > > > while the other thread is running the "if (likely(vma->anon_vma))"
> > > > > check, you get a (AFAIK benign) data race.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for checking, Jann.
> > > >
> > > > To double check"
> > > >
> > > > "vma->anon_vma = anon_vma" is done w/o store-release, so the lockless
> > > > readers can't read anon_vma contents, is it correct? So none of them
> > > > really reading anon_vma, right?
> > >
> > > I think you are right that this should be using store-release;
> > > searching around, I also mentioned this in
> > > <https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG48ez0qsAM-dkOUDetmNBSK4typ5t_FvMvtGiB7wQsP-G1jVg@mail.gmail.com/>:
> > >
> > > | > +Note that there are some exceptions to this - the `anon_vma`
> > > field is permitted
> > > | > +to be written to under mmap read lock and is instead serialised
> > > by the `struct
> > > | > +mm_struct` field `page_table_lock`. In addition the `vm_mm` and all
> > > |
> > > | Hm, we really ought to add some smp_store_release() and READ_ONCE(),
> > > | or something along those lines, around our ->anon_vma accesses...
> > > | especially the "vma->anon_vma = anon_vma" assignment in
> > > | __anon_vma_prepare() looks to me like, on architectures like arm64
> > > | with write-write reordering, we could theoretically end up making a
> > > | new anon_vma pointer visible to a concurrent page fault before the
> > > | anon_vma has been initialized? Though I have no idea if that is
> > > | practically possible, stuff would have to be reordered quite a bit for
> > > | that to happen...
>
> As far as the page fault is concerned it only really cares about whether it
> exists or not, not whether it's initialised.
Hmm, yeah, I'm not sure if anything in the page fault path actually
directly accesses the anon_vma. The page fault path does eventually
re-publish the anon_vma pointer with `WRITE_ONCE(folio->mapping,
(struct address_space *) anon_vma)` in __folio_set_anon() though,
which could then potentially allow a third thread to walk through
folio->mapping and observe the uninitialized anon_vma...
Looking at the situation on latest stable (v6.18.5), two racing faults
on _adjacent_ anonymous VMAs could also end up with one thread writing
->anon_vma while the other thread executes reusable_anon_vma(),
loading the pointer to that anon_vma and accessing its
->anon_vma_chain.
> The operations that check/modify fields within the anon_vma are protected by the
> anon rmap lock (my recent series takes advantage of this to avoid holding that
> lock during AVC allocation for instance).
>
> This lock also protects the interval tree.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-14 18:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-14 16:32 syzbot
2026-01-14 16:42 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2026-01-14 16:59 ` Jann Horn
2026-01-14 17:05 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2026-01-14 17:29 ` Jann Horn
2026-01-14 17:48 ` Jann Horn
2026-01-14 18:02 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-01-14 18:23 ` Jann Horn [this message]
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