Re: [PATCH 0/3] KASLR feature to randomize each loadable module

[Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 3:37 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:34 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Rick Edgecombe
> > <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> wrote:
> > > This patch changes the module loading KASLR algorithm to randomize the position
> > > of each module text section allocation with at least 18 bits of entropy in the
> > > typical case. It used on x86_64 only for now.
> >
> > Very cool! Thanks for sending the series. :)
> >
> > > Today the RANDOMIZE_BASE feature randomizes the base address where the module
> > > allocations begin with 10 bits of entropy. From here, a highly deterministic
> > > algorithm allocates space for the modules as they are loaded and un-loaded. If
> > > an attacker can predict the order and identities for modules that will be
> > > loaded, then a single text address leak can give the attacker access to the
> >
> > nit: "text address" -> "module text address"
> >
> > > So the defensive strength of this algorithm in typical usage (<800 modules) for
> > > x86_64 should be at least 18 bits, even if an address from the random area
> > > leaks.
> >
> > And most systems have <200 modules, really. I have 113 on a desktop
> > right now, 63 on a server. So this looks like a trivial win.
[...]
> Also: What's the impact on memory usage? Is this going to increase the
> number of pagetables that need to be allocated by the kernel per
> module_alloc() by 4K or 8K or so?

Sorry, I meant increase the amount of memory used by pagetables by 4K
or 8K, not the number of pagetables.