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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: timofey.titovets@synesis.ru
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	nefelim4ag@gmail.com, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3] KSM: allow dedup all tasks memory
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 12:57:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez0VRmRQckOjQhOeaf6bLYkfi45ksdnzuCKPwBYTM+As1g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181112231344.7161-1-timofey.titovets@synesis.ru>

On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 12:40 PM Timofey Titovets
<timofey.titovets@synesis.ru> wrote:
> ksm by default working only on memory that added by
> madvise().
>
> And only way get that work on other applications:
>   * Use LD_PRELOAD and libraries
>   * Patch kernel
>
> Lets use kernel task list and add logic to import VMAs from tasks.
>
> That behaviour controlled by new attributes:
>   * mode:
>     I try mimic hugepages attribute, so mode have two states:
>       * madvise      - old default behaviour
>       * always [new] - allow ksm to get tasks vma and
>                        try working on that.

Please don't. And if you really have to for some reason, put some big
warnings on this, advising people that it's a security risk.

KSM is one of the favorite punching bags of side-channel and hardware
security researchers:

As a gigantic, problematic side channel:
http://staff.aist.go.jp/k.suzaki/EuroSec2011-suzaki.pdf
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot15/woot15-paper-barresi.pdf
https://access.redhat.com/blogs/766093/posts/1976303
https://gruss.cc/files/dedup.pdf

In particular https://gruss.cc/files/dedup.pdf ("Practical Memory
Deduplication Attacks in Sandboxed JavaScript") shows that KSM makes
it possible to use malicious JavaScript to determine whether a given
page of memory exists elsewhere on your system.

And also as a way to target rowhammer-based faults:
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_razavi.pdf
https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2017/10/19/attacking-co-hosted-vm-hacker-hammer-two-memory-modules/

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-13 11:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-12 23:13 Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13  1:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-13 11:25   ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13  2:25 ` Pavel Tatashin
2018-11-13 11:40   ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 18:42     ` Pavel Tatashin
2018-11-13 22:55       ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 11:57 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2018-11-13 12:58   ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 13:25     ` Jann Horn
     [not found] <<CAG48ez0ZprqUYGZFxcrY6U3Dnwt77q1NJXzzpsn1XNkRuXVppw@mail.gmail.com>
2018-11-13 14:23 ` Oleksandr Natalenko
2018-11-13 17:59   ` Pavel Tatashin
2018-11-13 18:17     ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 18:35       ` Pavel Tatashin
2018-11-13 18:54         ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 19:16           ` Pavel Tatashin
2018-11-13 22:40             ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 22:53               ` Pavel Tatashin
2018-11-13 23:07                 ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 20:26     ` Jann Horn
2018-11-13 22:35       ` Pavel Tatashin
     [not found] <<20181112231344.7161-1-timofey.titovets@synesis.ru>
2018-11-13 11:06 ` Oleksandr Natalenko
2018-11-13 11:56   ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 16:33 ` Oleksandr Natalenko
2018-11-13 17:10   ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 17:27     ` Oleksandr Natalenko
2018-11-13 17:44       ` Timofey Titovets
2018-11-13 18:20 Timofey Titovets

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