From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rcu@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, lkmm@vger.kernel.org,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>,
Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
maged.michael@gmail.com,
Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] hazptr: Add initial implementation of hazard pointers
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 02:12:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez0VN8oZcqhdzkWQgNv6bwUN=MUu5EacLg5iPvMQL+R-Qg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240917143402.930114-2-boqun.feng@gmail.com>
On Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 4:33 PM Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hazard pointers [1] provide a way to dynamically distribute refcounting
> and can be used to improve the scalability of refcounting without
> significant space cost.
> +static inline void *__hazptr_tryprotect(hazptr_t *hzp,
> + void *const *p,
> + unsigned long head_offset)
> +{
> + void *ptr;
> + struct callback_head *head;
> +
> + ptr = READ_ONCE(*p);
> +
> + if (ptr == NULL)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + head = (struct callback_head *)(ptr + head_offset);
> +
> + WRITE_ONCE(*hzp, head);
> + smp_mb();
> +
> + ptr = READ_ONCE(*p); // read again
> +
> + if (ptr + head_offset != head) { // pointer changed
> + WRITE_ONCE(*hzp, NULL); // reset hazard pointer
> + return NULL;
> + } else
> + return ptr;
> +}
I got nerdsniped by the Plumbers talk. So, about that smp_mb()...
I think you should be able to avoid the smp_mb() using relaxed atomics
(on architectures that have those), at the cost of something like a
cmpxchg-acquire sandwiched between a load-acquire and a relaxed load?
I'm not sure how their cost compares to an smp_mb() though.
Something like this, *assuming there can only be one context at a time
waiting for a given hazptr_t*:
typedef struct {
/* consists of: marker bit in least significant bit, rest is normal pointer */
atomic_long_t value;
} hazptr_t;
/* assumes that hzp is currently set to NULL (but it may contain a
marker bit) */
static inline void *__hazptr_tryprotect(hazptr_t *hzp, void *const *p) {
/* note that the loads of these three operations are ordered using
acquire semantics */
void *ptr = smp_load_acquire(p);
/* set pointer while leaving marker bit intact */
unsigned long hazard_scanning =
atomic_long_fetch_or_acquire((unsigned long)ptr, &hzp->value);
if (unlikely(hazard_scanning)) {
BUG_ON(hazard_scanning != 1);
/* slowpath, concurrent hazard pointer waiter */
smp_mb();
}
if (READ_ONCE(*p) == ptr) { /* recheck */
atomic_long_and(~1UL, &hzp->value);
return NULL;
}
return ptr;
}
/* simplified for illustration, assumes there's only a single hazard
pointer @hzp that could point to @ptr */
static void remove_pointer_and_wait_for_hazard(hazptr_t *hzp, void
*ptr, void *const *p) {
WRITE_ONCE(*p, NULL);
smb_mb();
/* set marker bit */
atomic_long_or(1UL, &hzp->value);
while ((void*)(atomic_long_read(&hzp->value) & ~1UL) == ptr))
wait();
/* clear marker bit */
atomic_long_and(~1UL, &hzp->value);
}
The idea would be that the possible orderings when these two functions
race against each other are:
Ordering A: The atomic_long_fetch_or_acquire() in
__hazptr_tryprotect() happens after the atomic_long_or(), two
subcases:
Ordering A1 (slowpath): atomic_long_fetch_or_acquire() is ordered
before the atomic_long_and() in remove_pointer_and_wait_for_hazard(),
so the marker bit is observed set, "hazard_scanning" is true. We go on
the safe slowpath which is like the original patch, so it's safe.
Ordering A2 (recheck fails): atomic_long_fetch_or_acquire() is ordered
after the atomic_long_and() in remove_pointer_and_wait_for_hazard(),
so the subsequent READ_ONCE(*p) is also ordered after the
atomic_long_and(), which is ordered after the WRITE_ONCE(*p, NULL), so
the READ_ONCE(*p) recheck must see a NULL pointer and fail.
Ordering B (hazard pointer visible): The
atomic_long_fetch_or_acquire() in __hazptr_tryprotect() happens before
the atomic_long_or(). In that case, it also happens before the
atomic_long_read() in remove_pointer_and_wait_for_hazard(), so the
hazard pointer will be visible to
remove_pointer_and_wait_for_hazard().
But this seems pretty gnarly/complicated, so even if my 2AM reasoning
ability is correct, actually implementing this might not be a good
idea... and it definitely wouldn't help on X86 at all, since X86
doesn't have such nice relaxed RMW ops.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-19 0:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-17 14:33 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Add hazard pointers to kernel Boqun Feng
2024-09-17 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] hazptr: Add initial implementation of hazard pointers Boqun Feng
2024-09-18 8:27 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-18 15:17 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-19 6:56 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-19 18:07 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-19 0:12 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2024-09-19 20:30 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-20 7:43 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-19 6:39 ` Lai Jiangshan
2024-09-19 7:10 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-19 12:33 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-19 13:57 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-19 18:58 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-19 19:53 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-19 16:10 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-19 14:00 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-20 7:41 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-25 10:02 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-25 10:11 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-25 10:45 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-25 11:59 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-25 12:16 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-25 12:47 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-25 13:10 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-25 13:20 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-26 6:16 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-26 15:53 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-26 16:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-26 16:40 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-26 16:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-27 0:01 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-27 1:30 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 1:37 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-27 4:28 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-27 10:59 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 14:43 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 15:22 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 16:06 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-27 16:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-27 17:15 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-27 17:51 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 18:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-27 19:12 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-27 19:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-27 20:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-27 20:02 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 1:20 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 4:38 ` Boqun Feng
2024-09-27 19:23 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-27 20:10 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-09-27 22:18 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-28 22:10 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-28 23:12 ` Alan Huang
2024-09-25 12:19 ` Jonas Oberhauser
2024-09-17 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] refscale: Add benchmarks for hazptr Boqun Feng
2024-09-17 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] refscale: Add benchmarks for percpu_ref Boqun Feng
2024-09-17 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] WIP: hazptr: Add hazptr test sample Boqun Feng
2024-09-18 7:18 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] Add hazard pointers to kernel Linus Torvalds
2024-09-18 22:44 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2024-09-19 6:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-09-20 5:00 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2024-09-19 14:30 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-09-19 14:14 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-09-19 14:21 ` Linus Torvalds
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