From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pg0-f69.google.com (mail-pg0-f69.google.com [74.125.83.69]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F2DF6B0005 for ; Sat, 3 Feb 2018 15:12:22 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-pg0-f69.google.com with SMTP id m10so5819433pgq.1 for ; Sat, 03 Feb 2018 12:12:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-sor-f65.google.com (mail-sor-f65.google.com. [209.85.220.65]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id m3-v6sor663216pld.18.2018.02.03.12.12.20 for (Google Transport Security); Sat, 03 Feb 2018 12:12:21 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <20180124175631.22925-1-igor.stoppa@huawei.com> <20180124175631.22925-5-igor.stoppa@huawei.com> <20180126053542.GA30189@bombadil.infradead.org> From: Boris Lukashev Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 15:12:20 -0500 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Igor Stoppa Cc: Christopher Lameter , Matthew Wilcox , Jann Horn , Jerome Glisse , Kees Cook , Michal Hocko , Laura Abbott , Christoph Hellwig , linux-security-module , Linux-MM , kernel list , Kernel Hardening On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 2:57 PM, Igor Stoppa wrote: >>> On Thu, 25 Jan 2018, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > >>>> It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API >>>> or whether we want a slab-based API. > I'd love to have some feedback specifically about the API. > > I have also some idea about userspace and how to extend the pmalloc > concept to it: > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/01/30/20 > > I'll be AFK intermittently for about 2 weeks, so i might not be able to > reply immediately, but from my perspective this would be just the > beginning of a broader hardening of both kernel and userspace that I'd > like to pursue. > > -- > igor Regarding the notion of validated protected memory, is there a method by which the resulting checksum could be used in a lookup table/function to resolve the location of the protected data? Effectively a hash table of protected allocations, with a benefit of dedup since any data matching the same key would be the same data (multiple identical cred structs being pushed around). Should leave the resolver address/csum in recent memory to check against, right? -- Boris Lukashev Systems Architect Semper Victus -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org