From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
To: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com,
baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
npache@redhat.com, ryan.roberts@arm.com, dev.jain@arm.com,
baohua@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
michael.roth@amd.com, vannapurve@google.com, ziy@nvidia.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled()
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2026 10:22:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEvNRgEoPs5ia+u0ODra6N4BdOwpYa04j8nDxwfNVyfCOWnM6g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADhLXY5nrTXmWMPeiLg37euyVeQsNDRUvKmQaPdxtE1YhPq_jQ@mail.gmail.com>
Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com> writes:
> On Mon, Feb 9, 2026 at 4:12 PM David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org> wrote:
>>
>> > Maybe introduce a AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS, which we can just easily
>> > rip out along with CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS later?
>>
>> On second thought, why do we pass the
>>
>> !inode_is_open_for_write(inode)
>>
>> in file_thp_enabled()?
>>
>> Isn't that the main problem for these memfd things?
>>
>> Maybe a get_write_access() is missing somewhere?
>>
>
> Hi David,
>
> Thanks for the suggestion. I looked into the get_write_access() path.
>
> Both guest_memfd and secretmem use alloc_file_pseudo() which skips
> calling get_write_access(), so i_writecount stays 0. That's why
> file_thp_enabled() sees them as read-only files.
>
> We could add get_write_access() after alloc_file_pseudo() in both, but
> I think that would be a hack rather than a proper fix:
>
> - i_writecount has a specific semantic: tracking how many fds have the
> file open for writing. We'd be bumping it just to influence
> file_thp_enabled() behavior.
>
I agree re-using i_writecount feels odd since it is abusing the idea of
being written to. I might have misunderstood the full context of
i_writecount though.
> - It doesn't express the actual intent. The real issue is that
> CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was never meant for pseudo-filesystem
> backed files.
>
> I think the AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS flag you suggested earlier is
> the cleaner approach. It is explicit, has no side effects, and is easy
> to rip out when CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS goes away.
>
I was considering other address space flags and I think the best might
be to make khugepaged respect AS_FOLIO_ORDER_MAX and have somewhere in
__vma_thp_allowable_orders() check the maximum allowed order for the
address space.
khugepaged is about consolidating memory to huge pages, so if the
address space doesn't allow a larger folio order, then khugepaged should
not operate on that memory.
The other options are
+ AS_UNEVICTABLE: Sounds like khugepaged should respect AS_UNEVICTABLE,
but IIUC evictability is more closely related to swapping and
khugepaged might operate on swappable memory? Both guest_memfd and
secretmem set AS_UNEVICTABLE.
+ AS_INACCESSIBLE: This is only used by guest_memfd, and is mostly used
to block migration. khugepaged kind of migrates the memory contents
too, but someday we want guest_memfd to support migration, and at that
time we would still want to block khugepaged, so I don't think we want
to reuse a flag that couples khugepaged to migration.
>
> [...snip...]
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-09 18:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-09 3:35 Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 10:24 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 10:41 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 13:06 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 18:22 ` Ackerley Tng [this message]
2026-02-09 19:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 20:13 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 21:31 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-10 23:00 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 0:58 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 2:01 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:16 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:35 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:44 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 1:59 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:28 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 14:50 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 15:38 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-12 22:19 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-13 5:02 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-13 9:06 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-21 4:37 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 1:51 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 23:37 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-10 17:51 ` kernel test robot
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