From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
To: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, david@redhat.com, ziy@nvidia.com,
baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, npache@redhat.com,
ryan.roberts@arm.com, dev.jain@arm.com, hannes@cmpxchg.org,
usamaarif642@gmail.com, gutierrez.asier@huawei-partners.com,
willy@infradead.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
andrii@kernel.org, ameryhung@gmail.com, rientjes@google.com,
corbet@lwn.net, 21cnbao@gmail.com, shakeel.butt@linux.dev,
tj@kernel.org, lance.yang@linux.dev, rdunlap@infradead.org,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 mm-new 07/11] bpf: mark vma->vm_mm as __safe_trusted_or_null
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2025 14:06:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEf4BzaGRDiW3fRt3i+7vvRB+oQszKjaLWVMSU6JrfmXHsJ45w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250930055826.9810-8-laoar.shao@gmail.com>
On Mon, Sep 29, 2025 at 11:00 PM Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> The vma->vm_mm might be NULL and it can be accessed outside of RCU. Thus,
> we can mark it as trusted_or_null. With this change, BPF helpers can safely
> access vma->vm_mm to retrieve the associated mm_struct from the VMA.
> Then we can make policy decision from the VMA.
>
> The "trusted" annotation enables direct access to vma->vm_mm within kfuncs
> marked with KF_TRUSTED_ARGS or KF_RCU, such as bpf_task_get_cgroup1() and
> bpf_task_under_cgroup(). Conversely, "null" enforcement requires all
> callsites using vma->vm_mm to perform NULL checks.
>
> The lsm selftest must be modified because it directly accesses vma->vm_mm
> without a NULL pointer check; otherwise it will break due to this
> change.
>
> For the VMA based THP policy, the use case is as follows,
>
> @mm = @vma->vm_mm; // vm_area_struct::vm_mm is trusted or null
> if (!@mm)
> return;
> bpf_rcu_read_lock(); // rcu lock must be held to dereference the owner
> @owner = @mm->owner; // mm_struct::owner is rcu trusted or null
> if (!@owner)
> goto out;
> @cgroup1 = bpf_task_get_cgroup1(@owner, MEMCG_HIERARCHY_ID);
>
> /* make the decision based on the @cgroup1 attribute */
>
> bpf_cgroup_release(@cgroup1); // release the associated cgroup
> out:
> bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
>
> PSI memory information can be obtained from the associated cgroup to inform
> policy decisions. Since upstream PSI support is currently limited to cgroup
> v2, the following example demonstrates cgroup v2 implementation:
>
> @owner = @mm->owner;
> if (@owner) {
> // @ancestor_cgid is user-configured
> @ancestor = bpf_cgroup_from_id(@ancestor_cgid);
> if (bpf_task_under_cgroup(@owner, @ancestor)) {
> @psi_group = @ancestor->psi;
>
> /* Extract PSI metrics from @psi_group and
> * implement policy logic based on the values
> */
>
> }
> }
>
> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
> Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
> Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 8 +++++---
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
Hey Yafang,
This looks like a generally useful change, so I think it would be best
if you can send it as a stand-alone patch to bpf-next to land it
sooner.
Also, am I imagining this, or did you have similar change for the
vm_file field as well? Any reasons to not mark vm_file as trusted as
well?
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index d400e18ee31e..b708b98f796c 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -7165,6 +7165,10 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) {
> struct sock *sk;
> };
>
> +BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) {
> + struct mm_struct *vm_mm;
> +};
> +
> static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
> const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
> @@ -7206,6 +7210,7 @@ static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> {
> BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket));
> BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry));
> + BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct));
>
> return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id,
> "__safe_trusted_or_null");
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> index 0c13b7409947..7de173daf27b 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> @@ -89,14 +89,16 @@ SEC("lsm/file_mprotect")
> int BPF_PROG(test_int_hook, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, int ret)
> {
> - if (ret != 0)
> + struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> +
> + if (ret != 0 || !mm)
> return ret;
>
> __s32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
> int is_stack = 0;
>
> - is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
> - vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack);
> + is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
> + vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack);
>
> if (is_stack && monitored_pid == pid) {
> mprotect_count++;
> --
> 2.47.3
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-06 21:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-30 5:58 [PATCH v9 mm-new 00/11] mm, bpf: BPF based THP order selection Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 01/11] mm: thp: remove vm_flags parameter from khugepaged_enter_vma() Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 02/11] mm: thp: remove vm_flags parameter from thp_vma_allowable_order() Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 03/11] mm: thp: add support for BPF based THP order selection Yafang Shao
2025-10-03 2:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-10-07 8:47 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 3:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-10-08 3:50 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 4:10 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-10-08 4:25 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 4:39 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-10-08 6:02 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 8:08 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-08 8:18 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 8:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-08 9:04 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 11:27 ` Zi Yan
2025-10-08 12:06 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-08 12:49 ` Gutierrez Asier
2025-10-08 12:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-08 13:11 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-09 9:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-09 9:59 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-10 7:54 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-11 2:13 ` Yafang Shao
2025-10-13 12:41 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-13 13:07 ` Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 04/11] mm: thp: decouple THP allocation between swap and page fault paths Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 05/11] mm: thp: enable THP allocation exclusively through khugepaged Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 06/11] bpf: mark mm->owner as __safe_rcu_or_null Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 07/11] bpf: mark vma->vm_mm as __safe_trusted_or_null Yafang Shao
2025-10-06 21:06 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2025-10-07 9:05 ` Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 08/11] selftests/bpf: add a simple BPF based THP policy Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 09/11] selftests/bpf: add test case to update " Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 10/11] selftests/bpf: add test cases for invalid thp_adjust usage Yafang Shao
2025-09-30 5:58 ` [PATCH v9 mm-new 11/11] Documentation: add BPF-based THP policy management Yafang Shao
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