From: "Stephen Röttger" <sroettger@google.com>
To: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
jeffxu@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
keescook@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org,
groeck@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
jannh@google.com, surenb@google.com, alex.sierra@amd.com,
apopple@nvidia.com, aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com,
axelrasmussen@google.com, ben@decadent.org.uk,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, david@redhat.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
ying.huang@intel.com, hughd@google.com, joey.gouly@arm.com,
corbet@lwn.net, wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, lstoakes@gmail.com,
mawupeng1@huawei.com, linmiaohe@huawei.com, namit@vmware.com,
peterx@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, ryan.roberts@arm.com,
shr@devkernel.io, vbabka@suse.cz, xiujianfeng@huawei.com,
yu.ma@intel.com, zhangpeng362@huawei.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
luto@kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/8] Introduce mseal() syscall
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 10:28:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEAAPHbB0yZfpXGMib4bbH8z5diKfur5M6mAfZuB6qi9UVpcPw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7071.1697661373@cvs.openbsd.org>
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> > IMO: The approaches mimmutable() and mseal() took are different, but
> > we all want to seal the memory from attackers and make the linux
> > application safer.
>
> I think you are building mseal for chrome, and chrome alone.
>
> I do not think this will work out for the rest of the application space
> because
>
> 1) it is too complicated
> 2) experience with mimmutable() says that applications don't do any of it
> themselves, it is all in execve(), libc initialization, and ld.so.
> You don't strike me as an execve, libc, or ld.so developer.
We do want to build this in a way that it can be applied automatically by ld.so
and we appreciate all your feedback on this. The intention of
splitting the sealing
by syscall was to provide flexibility while still allowing ld.so to
seal all operations.
But it's clear from the feedback that both the fine grained split and
the per-syscall
approach are not the right way to go.
Does Linus' proposal to just split munmap / mprotect sealing address your
complexity concerns? ld.so would always use both flags which should then behave
similar to mimmutable().
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-19 8:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-16 14:38 jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/8] Add mseal syscall jeffxu
2023-10-16 15:05 ` Greg KH
2023-10-17 6:50 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/8] Wire up " jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/8] mseal: add can_modify_mm and can_modify_vma jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/8] mseal: seal mprotect jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/8] mseal munmap jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 6/8] mseal mremap jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 7/8] mseal mmap jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 8/8] selftest mm/mseal mprotect/munmap/mremap/mmap jeffxu
2023-10-16 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/8] Introduce mseal() syscall Matthew Wilcox
2023-10-17 8:34 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 12:56 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-10-17 15:29 ` Pedro Falcato
2023-10-17 21:33 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 22:35 ` Pedro Falcato
2023-10-18 18:20 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-19 17:30 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-19 22:47 ` Pedro Falcato
2023-10-19 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-23 17:44 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-23 17:42 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-16 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-17 9:07 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 17:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-17 18:20 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-17 18:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-17 18:55 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-19 8:00 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-10-20 16:27 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-24 10:42 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-10-17 23:01 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 23:56 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-18 3:18 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-18 3:37 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-18 15:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-10-18 18:54 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-18 20:36 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-19 8:28 ` Stephen Röttger [this message]
2023-10-20 15:55 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-16 17:34 ` Jann Horn
2023-10-17 8:42 ` Jeff Xu
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