Re: [PATCH 0/6] Memory Mapping (VMA) protection using PKU - set 1

["Stephen Röttger" <sroettger@google.com>]

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Hi Dave,

Since we're using the feature for control-flow integrity, we assume the
control-flow is still intact at this point. I.e. the attacker thread can't
run arbitrary instructions.
* For JIT code, we're going to scan it for wrpkru instructions before
writing it to executable memory
* For regular code, we only use wrpkru around short critical sections to
temporarily enable write access

Sigreturn is a separate problem that we hope to solve by adding pkey
support to sigaltstack

On Mon, May 15, 2023, 16:28 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:

> On 5/15/23 06:05, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> > We're using PKU for in-process isolation to enforce control-flow
> integrity
> > for a JIT compiler. In our threat model, an attacker exploits a
> > vulnerability and has arbitrary read/write access to the whole process
> > space concurrently to other threads being executed. This attacker can
> > manipulate some arguments to syscalls from some threads.
>
> This all sounds like it hinges on the contents of PKRU in the attacker
> thread.
>
> Could you talk a bit about how the attacker is prevented from running
> WRPKRU, XRSTOR or compelling the kernel to write to PKRU like at sigreturn?
>

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