From: "Stephen Röttger" <sroettger@google.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>,
jeffxu@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
keescook@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org,
groeck@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
jannh@google.com, surenb@google.com, alex.sierra@amd.com,
apopple@nvidia.com, aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com,
axelrasmussen@google.com, ben@decadent.org.uk,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, david@redhat.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
ying.huang@intel.com, hughd@google.com, joey.gouly@arm.com,
corbet@lwn.net, wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com,
Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, lstoakes@gmail.com,
willy@infradead.org, mawupeng1@huawei.com, linmiaohe@huawei.com,
namit@vmware.com, peterx@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
ryan.roberts@arm.com, shr@devkernel.io, vbabka@suse.cz,
xiujianfeng@huawei.com, yu.ma@intel.com,
zhangpeng362@huawei.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/8] Introduce mseal() syscall
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2023 10:00:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEAAPHYgg49WtpE7Jdq6HDecFp5RHPhdxtPTUaNF12RONu5aDA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wjS=xg12RVQdTNxEurjo21eXQBQO0D5My6Aox4LCfsO1A@mail.gmail.com>
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> I do like us starting with just "mimmutable()", since it already
> exists. Particularly if chrome already knows how to use it.
>
> Maybe add a flag field (require it to be zero initially) just to allow
> any future expansion. Maybe the chrome team has *wanted* to have some
> finer granularity thing and currently doesn't use mimmutable() in some
> case?
Yes, we do have a use case in Chrome to split the sealing into unmap and
mprotect which will allow us to seal additional pages that we can't seal with
pure mimmutable().
For example, we have pkey-tagged RWX memory that we want to seal. Since
the memory is already RWX and the pkey controls write access, we don't care
about permission changes but sometimes we do need to mprotect data only
pages.
But the munmap sealing will provide protection against implicit changes of the
pkey in this case which would happen if a page gets unmapped and another
mapped in its place.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-19 8:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-16 14:38 jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/8] Add mseal syscall jeffxu
2023-10-16 15:05 ` Greg KH
2023-10-17 6:50 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/8] Wire up " jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/8] mseal: add can_modify_mm and can_modify_vma jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/8] mseal: seal mprotect jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/8] mseal munmap jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 6/8] mseal mremap jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 7/8] mseal mmap jeffxu
2023-10-16 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v1 8/8] selftest mm/mseal mprotect/munmap/mremap/mmap jeffxu
2023-10-16 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/8] Introduce mseal() syscall Matthew Wilcox
2023-10-17 8:34 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 12:56 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-10-17 15:29 ` Pedro Falcato
2023-10-17 21:33 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 22:35 ` Pedro Falcato
2023-10-18 18:20 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-19 17:30 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-19 22:47 ` Pedro Falcato
2023-10-19 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-23 17:44 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-23 17:42 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-16 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-17 9:07 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 17:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-17 18:20 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-17 18:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-17 18:55 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-19 8:00 ` Stephen Röttger [this message]
2023-10-20 16:27 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-24 10:42 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-10-17 23:01 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-17 23:56 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-18 3:18 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-18 3:37 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-18 15:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2023-10-18 18:54 ` Jeff Xu
2023-10-18 20:36 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-19 8:28 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-10-20 15:55 ` Theo de Raadt
2023-10-16 17:34 ` Jann Horn
2023-10-17 8:42 ` Jeff Xu
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