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From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] x86: KASAN: Sanitize unauthorized irq stack access
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 20:31:53 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bbVRpdUJsK9pZshbJW-0D7bvquK2QVpzrpomw5cS1X_g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6638b09b-30b0-861e-9c00-c294889a3791@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 7:38 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On 02/07/2018 08:14 AM, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
>> Sometimes it is possible to meet a situation,
>> when irq stack is corrupted, while innocent
>> callback function is being executed. This may
>> happen because of crappy drivers irq handlers,
>> when they access wrong memory on the irq stack.
>
> Can you be more clear about the actual issue?  Which drivers do this?
> How do they even find an IRQ stack pointer?
>
>> This patch aims to catch such the situations
>> and adds checks of unauthorized stack access.
>
> I think I forgot how KASAN did this.  KASAN has metadata that says which
> areas of memory are good or bad to access, right?  So, this just tags
> IRQ stacks as bad when we are not _in_ an interrupt?

Correct.
kasan_poison/unpoison_shadow effectively memset separate "shadow"
memory range, which is then checked by memory accesses to understand
if it's OK to access corresponding memory.


>> +#define KASAN_IRQ_STACK_SIZE \
>> +     (sizeof(union irq_stack_union) - \
>> +             (offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) + 8))
>
> Just curious, but why leave out the canary?  It shouldn't be accessed
> either.
>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
>> +void __visible x86_poison_irq_stack(void)
>> +{
>> +     if (this_cpu_read(irq_count) == -1)
>> +             kasan_poison_irq_stack();
>> +}
>> +void __visible x86_unpoison_irq_stack(void)
>> +{
>> +     if (this_cpu_read(irq_count) == -1)
>> +             kasan_unpoison_irq_stack();
>> +}
>> +#endif
>
> It might be handy to point out here that -1 means "not in an interrupt"
> and >=0 means "in an interrupt".
>
> Otherwise, this looks pretty straightforward.  Would it be something to
> extend to the other stacks like the NMI or double-fault stacks?  Or are
> those just not worth it?

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-07 19:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-07 16:14 Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-07 18:38 ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-07 19:31   ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2018-02-08 10:03   ` Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-08 16:30     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-08 16:41       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-02-08 17:20         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-08 19:00           ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-09  8:53             ` Kirill Tkhai

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