From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-it1-f199.google.com (mail-it1-f199.google.com [209.85.166.199]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0DE78E01DC for ; Fri, 14 Dec 2018 09:31:57 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-it1-f199.google.com with SMTP id i12so5881915ita.3 for ; Fri, 14 Dec 2018 06:31:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-sor-f65.google.com (mail-sor-f65.google.com. [209.85.220.65]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id j187sor9706122itb.29.2018.12.14.06.31.56 for (Google Transport Security); Fri, 14 Dec 2018 06:31:56 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <0000000000004ea80b057cfae21e@google.com> <20181214132836.GE5343@dhcp22.suse.cz> <20181214135419.GG5343@dhcp22.suse.cz> In-Reply-To: <20181214135419.GG5343@dhcp22.suse.cz> From: Dmitry Vyukov Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 15:31:44 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: general protection fault in watchdog Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Michal Hocko , Pablo Neira Ayuso , Jozsef Kadlecsik , Florian Westphal , David Miller , NetFilter , netdev Cc: syzbot , Andrew Morton , LKML , Paul McKenney , Tetsuo Handa , rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, syzkaller-bugs , vkuznets@redhat.com, Linux-MM On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 2:54 PM Michal Hocko wrote: > > On Fri 14-12-18 14:42:33, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 2:28 PM Michal Hocko wrote: > > > > > > On Fri 14-12-18 14:11:05, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 1:51 PM syzbot > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > > > > > syzbot found the following crash on: > > > > > > > > > > HEAD commit: f5d582777bcb Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel... > > > > > git tree: upstream > > > > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16aca143400000 > > > > > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c8970c89a0efbb23 > > > > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7713f3aa67be76b1552c > > > > > compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) > > > > > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1131381b400000 > > > > > C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=13bae593400000 > > > > > > > > > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: > > > > > Reported-by: syzbot+7713f3aa67be76b1552c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > > > > > > > +linux-mm for memcg question > > > > > > > > What the repro does is effectively just > > > > setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES). This eats all machine memory and > > > > causes OOMs. Somehow it also caused the GPF in watchdog when it > > > > iterates over task list, perhaps some scheduler code leaves a dangling > > > > pointer on OOM failures. > > > > > > > > But what bothers me is a different thing. syzkaller test processes are > > > > sandboxed with a restrictive memcg which should prevent them from > > > > eating all memory. do_replace_finish calls vmalloc, which uses > > > > GFP_KERNEL, which does not include GFP_ACCOUNT (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT > > > > does). And page alloc seems to change memory against memcg iff > > > > GFP_ACCOUNT is provided. > > > > Am I missing something or vmalloc is indeed not accounted (DoS)? I see > > > > some explicit uses of GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, e.g. the one below, but they > > > > seem to be very sparse. > > > > > > > > static void *seq_buf_alloc(unsigned long size) > > > > { > > > > return kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > > > > } > > > > > > > > Now looking at the code I also don't see how kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL) is > > > > accounted... Which makes me think I am still missing something. > > > > > > You are not missing anything. We do not account all allocations and you > > > have to explicitly opt-in by __GFP_ACCOUNT. This is a deliberate > > > decision. If the allocation is directly controlable by an untrusted user > > > and the memory is associated with a process life time then this looks > > > like a good usecase for __GFP_ACCOUNT. If an allocation outlives a > > > process then there the flag should be considered with a great care > > > because oom killer is not able to resolve the memcg pressure and so the > > > limit enforcement is not effective. > > > > Interesting. > > I understand that namespaces, memcg's and processes (maybe even > > threads) can have arbitrary overlapping. But I naively thought that in > > canonical hierarchical cases it should all somehow work. > > Question 1: is there some other, stricter sandboxing mechanism? > > I do not think so > > > We try > > to sandbox syzkaller processes with everything available , because > > these OOMs usually leads either to dead machines or hang/stall false > > positives, which are nasty. > > Which is a useful test on its own. If you are able to trigger the global > OOM from a restricted environment then you have a good candidate to > consider a new __GFP_ACCOUNT user. > > > Question 2: this is a simple DoS vector, right? If I put a container > > into a 1MB memcg, it can still eat arbitrary amount of non-pagable > > kernel memory? > > As I've said. If there is a direct vector to allocated an unbounded > amount of memory from the userspace (trusted users aside) then yes this > sounds like a DoS to me. +netfilter maintainers for this easy DoS vector short story: vmalloc in do_replace_finish allows unbounded memory allocation not accounted to memcg Looks pretty unbounded: [ 763.451796] syz-executor681: vmalloc: allocation failure, allocated 1027440640 of 1879052288 bytes, mode:0x6000c0(GFP_KERNEL), nodemask=(null) But how does this play with what you said about memory outliving process? Netfilter tables can definitely outlive the process, they are attached to net ns. Also, am I reading this correctly that potentially thousands of kernel memory allocations need to be converted to ACCOUNT? I mean for small ones we maybe care less, but they _should_ be accounted. They can also build up, or just simply allow small repeated allocations. GFP_KERNEL Referenced in 11070 files: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/ident/GFP_KERNEL GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT Referenced in 19 files: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/ident/GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT