From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH mm v3 04/19] kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 12:00:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+a4ZoBm3jC308kradyeYcXKMMux4uTSgs4cWkby5Th+bw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d65e2fc1d7fc03b7ced67e401ff1ea9143b3382d.1605305978.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:20 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> wrote:
>
> There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for
> KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for
> stack variables.
>
> There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled.
> Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is
> enabled.
>
> Note, that CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is an option that is currently always
> defined when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled, and therefore has to be tested
> with #if instead of #ifdef.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If8a891e9fe01ea543e00b576852685afec0887e3
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +-
> include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++----
> mm/kasan/common.c | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
> */
> bl cpu_do_resume
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> mov x0, sp
> bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
> movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
> movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> /*
> * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
> * which we now need to unpoison.
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 0c89e6fdd29e..f2109bf0c5f9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
>
> void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);
>
> -void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
> -
> void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
> void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
>
> @@ -122,8 +120,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
>
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
>
> -static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
> -
> static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
> static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
>
> @@ -175,6 +171,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
> +#else
> +static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
> +#endif
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
>
> void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 0a420f1dbc54..7648a2452a01 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
> unpoison_range(address, size);
> }
>
> +#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
> {
> void *base = task_stack_page(task);
> @@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
>
> unpoison_range(base, watermark - base);
> }
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
>
> void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> {
> --
> 2.29.2.299.gdc1121823c-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-16 11:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-13 22:19 [PATCH mm v3 00/19] kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 01/19] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 02/19] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 03/19] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 04/19] kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 11:00 ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 05/19] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 11:01 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 06/19] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 07/19] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-17 10:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 08/19] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-17 10:58 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:19 ` [PATCH mm v3 09/19] kasan: open-code kasan_unpoison_slab Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:06 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 10/19] kasan: inline (un)poison_range and check_invalid_free Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:11 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 11/19] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:15 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 11:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 12/19] kasan, mm: check kasan_enabled in annotations Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:26 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 11:12 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 13/19] kasan, mm: rename kasan_poison_kfree Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:43 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 14/19] kasan: don't round_up too much Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 15/19] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 16/19] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 17/19] kasan: clean up metadata allocation and usage Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:46 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:12 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-17 13:18 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:27 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-23 18:54 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 19:16 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 18/19] kasan, mm: allow cache merging with no metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:45 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:25 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-23 13:52 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-13 22:20 ` [PATCH mm v3 19/19] kasan: update documentation Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 15:47 ` Marco Elver
2020-11-17 13:28 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-16 14:48 ` [PATCH mm v3 00/19] kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode Vincenzo Frascino
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