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charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam05 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 95C3880008 X-Stat-Signature: twakagqmto13wgn63fiukuba4ajngtig X-HE-Tag: 1713528310-623947 X-HE-Meta: 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 CgSDp17J gHGT6Ix2XRyYQUH1IGB7DgBYPs25iNuBfW9ObkWv17fxiObIOvsuTAH7cV7c47U74J//0HIzNKeGYH2x2qvTJH2rGxR0Roj5DG+HZ2ayYOtvfp2526ui+ebmvyX8rgPOKkAX7wp6rIw8FPclQR+4u9ybPE7R4vIbp4/ecAHEqyqhdNgxPVUyVHLCirO6s9d56fEVJuPxj3oV7r8WrR3L8asQVE7BRzhG7CwW9L4lISbGrszw0NX3aSSHhZG+9OsohAz/Wtl9eYvLxtr4p+L5JPvIrifVOhgbIcwteCpHP1SFgD0Pgrv7+J6H9KrGcrzrAqi5a7U1JGOBoV1Ig3s30ZRvfkxvI6VCQgwaiHY7JID9wWTltO+3ggCqS8yjGIrg1s2OJtvViWwLw0lg= X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 9:42=E2=80=AFPM Michael Roth = wrote: > > This patchset is also available at: > > https://github.com/amdese/linux/commits/snp-host-v13 > > and is based on commit 4d2deb62185f (as suggested by Paolo) from: > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git/log/?h=3Dkvm-coco-queue This is pretty much ready to go into kvm-coco-queue. Let me know if you want to do a quick v14 with the few changes I suggested, or I can do them too. Then the next steps are: 1) get the mm acks 2) figure out the state of patches 1-3 3) wait for more reviews of course 4) merge everything into kvm/next. Seems in good shape for a 6.10 target. Paolo > > Patch Layout > ------------ > > 01-03: These patches are minor dependencies for this series and are alrea= dy > included in both tip/master and mainline, so are only included her= e > as a stop-gap until merged from one of those trees. These are need= ed > by patch #8 in this series which makes use of CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP > > 04: This is a small general fix-up for guest_memfd that can be applied > independently of this series. > > 05-08: These patches add some basic infrastructure and introduces a new > KVM_X86_SNP_VM vm_type to handle differences verses the existing > KVM_X86_SEV_VM and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM types. > > 09-11: These implement the KVM API to handle the creation of a > cryptographic launch context, encrypt/measure the initial image > into guest memory, and finalize it before launching it. > > 12-17: These implement handling for various guest-generated events such > as page state changes, onlining of additional vCPUs, etc. > > 18-21: These implement the gmem hooks needed to prepare gmem-allocated > pages before mapping them into guest private memory ranges as > well as cleaning them up prior to returning them to the host for > use as normal memory. Because this supplants certain activities > like issued WBINVDs during KVM MMU invalidations, there's also > a patch to avoid duplicating that work to avoid unecessary > overhead. > > 22: With all the core support in place, the patch adds a kvm_amd modul= e > parameter to enable SNP support. > > 23-26: These patches all deal with the servicing of guest requests to han= dle > things like attestation, as well as some related host-management > interfaces. > > > Testing > ------- > > For testing this via QEMU, use the following tree: > > https://github.com/amdese/qemu/commits/snp-v4-wip3 > > A patched OVMF is also needed due to upstream KVM no longer supporting MM= IO > ranges that are mapped as private. It is recommended you build the AmdSev= X64 > variant as it provides the kernel-hashing support present in this series: > > https://github.com/amdese/ovmf/commits/apic-mmio-fix1d > > A basic command-line invocation for SNP would be: > > qemu-system-x86_64 -smp 32,maxcpus=3D255 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2 > -machine q35,confidential-guest-support=3Dsev0,memory-backend=3Dram1 > -object memory-backend-memfd,id=3Dram1,size=3D4G,share=3Dtrue,reserve= =3Dfalse > -object sev-snp-guest,id=3Dsev0,cbitpos=3D51,reduced-phys-bits=3D1,id-a= uth=3D > -bios OVMF_CODE-upstream-20240410-apic-mmio-fix1d-AmdSevX64.fd > > With kernel-hashing and certificate data supplied: > > qemu-system-x86_64 -smp 32,maxcpus=3D255 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2 > -machine q35,confidential-guest-support=3Dsev0,memory-backend=3Dram1 > -object memory-backend-memfd,id=3Dram1,size=3D4G,share=3Dtrue,reserve= =3Dfalse > -object sev-snp-guest,id=3Dsev0,cbitpos=3D51,reduced-phys-bits=3D1,id-a= uth=3D,certs-path=3D/home/mroth/cert.blob,kernel-hashes=3Don > -bios OVMF_CODE-upstream-20240410-apic-mmio-fix1d-AmdSevX64.fd > -kernel /boot/vmlinuz-$ver > -initrd /boot/initrd.img-$ver > -append "root=3DUUID=3Dd72a6d1c-06cf-4b79-af43-f1bac4f620f9 ro console= =3DttyS0,115200n8" > > With standard X64 OVMF package with separate image for persistent NVRAM: > > qemu-system-x86_64 -smp 32,maxcpus=3D255 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2 > -machine q35,confidential-guest-support=3Dsev0,memory-backend=3Dram1 > -object memory-backend-memfd,id=3Dram1,size=3D4G,share=3Dtrue,reserve= =3Dfalse > -object sev-snp-guest,id=3Dsev0,cbitpos=3D51,reduced-phys-bits=3D1,id-a= uth=3D > -bios OVMF_CODE-upstream-20240410-apic-mmio-fix1d.fd > -drive if=3Dpflash,format=3Draw,unit=3D0,file=3DOVMF_VARS-upstream-2024= 0410-apic-mmio-fix1d.fd,readonly=3Doff > > > Known issues / TODOs > -------------------- > > * SEV-ES guests may trigger the following warning: > > WARNING: CPU: 151 PID: 4003 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:5855 kvm_mmu_p= age_fault+0x33b/0x860 [kvm] > > It is assumed here that these will be resolved once the transition to > PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS is fully completed, but if that's not the case le= t me > know and will investigate further. > > * Base tree in some cases reports "Unpatched return thunk in use. This s= hould > not happen!" the first time it runs an SVM/SEV/SNP guests. This a rece= nt > regression upstream and unrelated to this series: > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CANpmjNOcKzEvLHoGGeL-boWDHJobwf= wyVxUqMq2kWeka3N4tXA@mail.gmail.com/T/ > > * 2MB hugepage support has been dropped pending discussion on how we pla= n to > re-enable it in gmem. > > * Host kexec should work, but there is a known issue with host kdump sup= port > while SNP guests are running that will be addressed as a follow-up. > > * SNP kselftests are currently a WIP and will be included as part of SNP > upstreaming efforts in the near-term. > > > SEV-SNP Overview > ---------------- > > This part of the Secure Encrypted Paging (SEV-SNP) series focuses on the > changes required to add KVM support for SEV-SNP. This series builds upon > SEV-SNP guest support, which is now in mainline, and and SEV-SNP host > initialization support, which is now in linux-next. > > While series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the > SEV-SNP VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by > the SEV-SNP such as interrupt protection, which will added in the future. > > With SNP, when pages are marked as guest-owned in the RMP table, they are > assigned to a specific guest/ASID, as well as a specific GFN with in the > guest. Any attempts to map it in the RMP table to a different guest/ASID, > or a different GFN within a guest/ASID, will result in an RMP nested page > fault. > > Prior to accessing a guest-owned page, the guest must validate it with a > special PVALIDATE instruction which will set a special bit in the RMP tab= le > for the guest. This is the only way to set the validated bit outside of t= he > initial pre-encrypted guest payload/image; any attempts outside the guest= to > modify the RMP entry from that point forward will result in the validated > bit being cleared, at which point the guest will trigger an exception if = it > attempts to access that page so it can be made aware of possible tamperin= g. > > One exception to this is the initial guest payload, which is pre-validate= d > by the firmware prior to launching. The guest can use Guest Message reque= sts > to fetch an attestation report which will include the measurement of the > initial image so that the guest can verify it was booted with the expecte= d > image/environment. > > After boot, guests can use Page State Change requests to switch pages > between shared/hypervisor-owned and private/guest-owned to share data for > things like DMA, virtio buffers, and other GHCB requests. > > In this implementation of SEV-SNP, private guest memory is managed by a n= ew > kernel framework called guest_memfd (gmem). With gmem, a new > KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES KVM ioctl has been added to tell the KVM > MMU whether a particular GFN should be backed by shared (normal) memory o= r > private (gmem-allocated) memory. To tie into this, Page State Change > requests are forward to userspace via KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT exits, which will > then issue the corresponding KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES call to set the > private/shared state in the KVM MMU. > > The gmem / KVM MMU hooks implemented in this series will then update the = RMP > table entries for the backing PFNs to set them to guest-owned/private whe= n > mapping private pages into the guest via KVM MMU, or use the normal KVM M= MU > handling in the case of shared pages where the corresponding RMP table > entries are left in the default shared/hypervisor-owned state. > > Feedback/review is very much appreciated! > > -Mike > > > Changes since v12: > > * rebased to latest kvm-coco-queue branch (commit 4d2deb62185f) > * add more input validation for SNP_LAUNCH_START, especially for handlin= g > things like MBO/MBZ policy bits, and API major/minor minimums. (Paolo) > * block SNP KVM instances from being able to run legacy SEV commands (Pa= olo) > * don't attempt to measure VMSA for vcpu 0/BSP before the others, let > userspace deal with the ordering just like with SEV-ES (Paolo) > * fix up docs for SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH (Paolo) > * introduce svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa flag to better distinguish > handling for guest-mapped vs non-guest-mapped VMSAs, rename > 'snp_ap_create' flag to 'snp_ap_waiting_for_reset' (Paolo) > * drop "KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VM= CB" > as it is no longer needed due to above VMSA rework > * replace pr_debug_ratelimited() messages for RMP #NPFs with a single tr= ace > event > * handle transient PSMASH_FAIL_INUSE return codes in kvm_gmem_invalidate= (), > switch to WARN_ON*()'s to indicate remaining error cases are not expec= ted > and should not be seen in practice. (Paolo) > * add a cond_resched() in kvm_gmem_invalidate() to avoid soft lock-ups w= hen > cleaning up large guest memory ranges. > * rename VLEK_REQUIRED to VCEK_DISABLE. it's be more applicable if anoth= er > key type ever gets added. > * don't allow attestation to be paused while an attestation request is > being processed by firmware (Tom) > * add missing Documentation entry for SNP_VLEK_LOAD > * collect Reviewed-by's from Paolo and Tom > > Changes since v11: > > * Rebase series on kvm-coco-queue and re-work to leverage more > infrastructure between SNP/TDX series. > * Drop KVM_SNP_INIT in favor of the new KVM_SEV_INIT2 interface introduc= ed > here (Paolo): > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240318233352.2728327-1-pbonzini@redha= t.com/ > * Drop exposure API fields related to things like VMPL levels, migration > agents, etc., until they are actually supported/used (Sean) > * Rework KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE handling to use a new > kvm_gmem_populate() interface instead of copying data directly into > gmem-allocated pages (Sean) > * Add support for SNP_LOAD_VLEK, rework the SNP_SET_CONFIG_{START,END} t= o > have simpler semantics that are applicable to management of SNP_LOAD_V= LEK > updates as well, rename interfaces to the now more appropriate > SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION > * Fix up documentation wording and do print warnings for > userspace-triggerable failures (Peter, Sean) > * Fix a race with AP_CREATION wake-up events (Jacob, Sean) > * Fix a memory leak with VMSA pages (Sean) > * Tighten up handling of RMP page faults to better distinguish between r= eal > and spurious cases (Tom) > * Various patch/documentation rewording, cleanups, etc. > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > Ashish Kalra (1): > KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP > > Borislav Petkov (AMD) (3): > [TEMP] x86/kvm/Kconfig: Have KVM_AMD_SEV select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFOR= M > [TEMP] x86/cc: Add cc_platform_set/_clear() helpers > [TEMP] x86/CPU/AMD: Track SNP host status with cc_platform_*() > > Brijesh Singh (10): > KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests > KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command > KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command > KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command > KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT > KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT > KVM: SEV: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT > KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults > KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP > KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event > > Michael Roth (10): > KVM: guest_memfd: Fix PTR_ERR() handling in __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() > KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=3D= y > KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support > KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests > KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages > KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating private pages > KVM: x86: Implement gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level > crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command > crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION commands > KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event > > Tom Lendacky (2): > KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol > KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event > > Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst | 69 +- > Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 73 + > .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 88 +- > arch/x86/coco/core.c | 52 + > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + > arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 22 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 19 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 9 +- > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 39 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 38 +- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 2 +- > arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 10 - > arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 + > arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 - > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 1 + > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1444 ++++++++++++++= +++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 39 +- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 50 + > arch/x86/kvm/trace.h | 31 + > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 19 +- > arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 106 +- > drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 85 +- > drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 4 +- > include/linux/cc_platform.h | 12 + > include/linux/psp-sev.h | 4 +- > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 28 + > include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 39 + > include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h | 9 + > virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 8 +- > 29 files changed, 2229 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) > >