From: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
To: Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
chrisl@kernel.org, kasong@tencent.com,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH] mm/page_alloc: fix use-after-free in swap due to stale page data after split_page()
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 18:49:00 +0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABXGCsNqk6pOkocJ0ctcHssCvke2kqhzoR2BGf_Hh1hWPZATuA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Hi,
I've been debugging a use-after-free bug in the swap subsystem that manifests
as a crash in free_swap_count_continuations() during swapoff on zram devices.
== Problem ==
KASAN reports wild-memory-access at address 0xdead000000000100 (LIST_POISON1):
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xfbd59c0000000020
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
[0xdead000000000100-0xdead000000000107]
RIP: 0010:__do_sys_swapoff+0x1151/0x1860
RBP: dead0000000000f8
R13: dead000000000100
The crash occurs when free_swap_count_continuations() iterates over a
list_head containing LIST_POISON values from a previous list_del().
== Root Cause ==
The swap subsystem uses vmalloc_to_page() to get struct page pointers for
the swap_map array, then uses page->private and page->lru for swap count
continuation lists.
When vmalloc allocates high-order pages without __GFP_COMP and splits them
via split_page(), the resulting pages may contain stale data:
1. post_alloc_hook() only clears page->private for the head page (page[0])
2. split_page() only calls set_page_refcounted() for tail pages
3. Tail pages retain whatever was in page->private and page->lru from
previous use - including LIST_POISON values from prior list_del() calls
In add_swap_count_continuation() (mm/swapfile.c):
if (!page_private(head)) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&head->lru);
set_page_private(head, SWP_CONTINUED);
}
If head is a vmalloc tail page with stale non-zero page->private, the
INIT_LIST_HEAD is skipped, leaving page->lru with poison values. When
free_swap_count_continuations() later iterates this list, it crashes.
The comment at line 3862 says "Page allocation does not initialize the
page's lru field, but it does always reset its private field" - this
assumption is incorrect for vmalloc pages obtained via split_page().
== Proposed Fix ==
Initialize page->private and page->lru for all pages in split_page().
This matches the documented expectation in mm/vmalloc.c:
"High-order allocations must be able to be treated as independent
small pages by callers... Some drivers do their own refcounting
on vmalloc_to_page() pages, some use page->mapping, page->lru, etc."
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -3122,6 +3122,16 @@ void split_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageCompound(page), page);
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!page_count(page), page);
+ /*
+ * Split pages may contain stale data from previous use. Initialize
+ * page->private and page->lru which may have LIST_POISON values.
+ */
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
+ for (i = 1; i < (1 << order); i++) {
+ set_page_private(page + i, 0);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page[i].lru);
+ }
+
for (i = 1; i < (1 << order); i++)
set_page_refcounted(page + i);
split_page_owner(page, order, 0);
== Testing ==
Reproduced with a stress test cycling swapon/swapoff on 8GB zram under
memory pressure:
- Without patch: crash within ~50 iterations
- With patch: 1154+ iterations, no crash
The bug was originally discovered on Fedora 44 with kernel 6.19.0-rc7
during normal system shutdown after extended use.
== Questions ==
1. Is split_page() the right place for this fix, or should the swap code
be more defensive about uninitialized vmalloc pages?
2. Should prep_new_page()/post_alloc_hook() initialize all pages in
high-order allocations, not just the head?
3. Are there other fields besides page->private and page->lru that
callers of split_page() might expect to be initialized?
Thoughts?
--
Best Regards,
Mike Gavrilov.
next reply other threads:[~2026-01-30 13:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-30 13:49 Mikhail Gavrilov [this message]
2026-01-30 13:59 ` Matthew Wilcox
2026-01-30 14:16 ` Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-01-30 15:30 ` Kairui Song
2026-01-30 15:47 ` Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-02-02 3:17 ` Kairui Song
2026-02-02 5:27 ` Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-02-02 17:54 ` Kairui Song
2026-02-02 20:21 ` Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-02-03 7:14 ` Mikhail Gavrilov
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