From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Christopher Li <sparse@chrisli.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Yury Norov <ynorov@caviumnetworks.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Michael Weiser <michael.weiser@gmx.de>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>,
Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>,
Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org>,
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Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>,
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Mark Brand <markbrand@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 15/15] khwasan: update kasan documentation
Date: Mon, 28 May 2018 14:21:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAeHK+y0BcnLRa_TL9OXPX2hR3doMpEv8kkcm6kHAMJOT+UoRA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <124d5ef1-f9ff-446e-6537-3fbcaa0cb82a@infradead.org>
On Sat, May 26, 2018 at 5:23 AM, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> wrote:
> On 04/20/2018 07:46 AM, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>> This patch updates KASAN documentation to reflect the addition of KHWASAN.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
>
> Hi,
> Just a few corrections below...
>
>> ---
>> Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 212 +++++++++++++++++-------------
>> 1 file changed, 122 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
>> index f7a18f274357..bd7859538b73 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
>> @@ -8,11 +8,18 @@ KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides
>> a fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds
>> bugs.
>>
>> -KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
>> -therefore you will need a GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is
>> -required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses to stack or global variables.
>> +KASAN has two modes: classic KASAN (a classic version, similar to user space
>> +ASan) and KHWASAN (a version based on memory tagging, similar to user space
>> +HWASan).
>>
>> -Currently KASAN is supported only for the x86_64 and arm64 architectures.
>> +KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert validity checks before every
>> +memory access, and therefore requires a compiler version that supports that.
>> +For classic KASAN you need GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is
>> +required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses on stack and global variables.
>> +TODO: compiler requirements for KHWASAN
>> +
>> +Currently classic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm64 and xtensa
>> +architectures, and KHWASAN is supported only for arm64.
>>
>> Usage
>> -----
>> @@ -21,12 +28,14 @@ To enable KASAN configure kernel with::
>>
>> CONFIG_KASAN = y
>>
>> -and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and
>> -inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary
>> -the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. Inline instrumentation requires a GCC
>> +and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable classic KASAN) and
>> +CONFIG_KASAN_HW (to enabled KHWASAN). You also need to choose choose between
>> +CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and inline are compiler
>> +instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary the latter is
>
> smaller binary while the latter is
>
>> +1.1 - 2 times faster. For classic KASAN inline instrumentation requires GCC
>> version 5.0 or later.
>>
>> -KASAN works with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators.
>> +Both KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators.
>> For better bug detection and nicer reporting, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
>>
>> To disable instrumentation for specific files or directories, add a line
>> @@ -43,85 +52,80 @@ similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
>> Error reports
>> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>
>> -A typical out of bounds access report looks like this::
>> +A typical out-of-bounds access classic KASAN report looks like this::
>>
>> ==================================================================
>> - BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] at addr ffff8800693bc5d3
>> - Write of size 1 by task modprobe/1689
>> - =============================================================================
>> - BUG kmalloc-128 (Not tainted): kasan error
>> - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> -
>> - Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
>> - INFO: Allocated in kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan] age=0 cpu=0 pid=1689
>> - __slab_alloc+0x4b4/0x4f0
>> - kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10b/0x190
>> - kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan]
>> - init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan]
>> - do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200
>> - load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20
>> - SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80
>> - system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
>> - INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001a4ef00 objects=17 used=7 fp=0xffff8800693bd728 flags=0x100000000004080
>> - INFO: Object 0xffff8800693bc558 @offset=1368 fp=0xffff8800693bc720
>> -
>> - Bytes b4 ffff8800693bc548: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
>> - Object ffff8800693bc558: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc568: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc578: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc588: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc598: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc5a8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc5b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
>> - Object ffff8800693bc5c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
>> - Redzone ffff8800693bc5d8: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........
>> - Padding ffff8800693bc718: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
>> - CPU: 0 PID: 1689 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B 3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #98
>> - Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
>> - ffff8800693bc000 0000000000000000 ffff8800693bc558 ffff88006923bb78
>> - ffffffff81cc68ae 00000000000000f3 ffff88006d407600 ffff88006923bba8
>> - ffffffff811fd848 ffff88006d407600 ffffea0001a4ef00 ffff8800693bc558
>> + BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan]
>> + Write of size 1 at addr ffff8800696f3d3b by task insmod/2734
>> +
>> + CPU: 0 PID: 2734 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.15.0+ #98
>> + Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
>> Call Trace:
>> - [<ffffffff81cc68ae>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58
>> - [<ffffffff811fd848>] print_trailer+0xf8/0x160
>> - [<ffffffffa00026a7>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffff811ff0f5>] object_err+0x35/0x40
>> - [<ffffffffa0002065>] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffff8120b9fa>] kasan_report_error+0x38a/0x3f0
>> - [<ffffffff8120a79f>] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40
>> - [<ffffffff8120b344>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x14/0x40
>> - [<ffffffff8120a79f>] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40
>> - [<ffffffffa00026a7>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffff8120a995>] __asan_store1+0x75/0xb0
>> - [<ffffffffa0002601>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0x1d/0xc3 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffffa0002065>] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffffa0002065>] kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffffa00026b0>] init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan]
>> - [<ffffffff810002d9>] do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200
>> - [<ffffffff811e4e5c>] ? __vunmap+0xec/0x160
>> - [<ffffffff81114f63>] load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20
>> - [<ffffffff8110fd70>] ? m_show+0x240/0x240
>> - [<ffffffff81115f06>] SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80
>> - [<ffffffff81cd3129>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
>> + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17
>> + dump_stack+0x83/0xbc lib/dump_stack.c:53
>> + print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:254
>> + kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352
>> + kasan_report+0x10e/0x220 mm/kasan/report.c:410
>> + __asan_report_store1_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:505
>> + kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan] lib/test_kasan.c:42
>> + kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x769 [test_kasan]
>> + do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x240 init/main.c:832
>> + do_init_module+0x1b6/0x542 kernel/module.c:3462
>> + load_module+0x6042/0x9030 kernel/module.c:3786
>> + SYSC_init_module+0x18f/0x1c0 kernel/module.c:3858
>> + SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10 kernel/module.c:3841
>> + do_syscall_64+0x198/0x480 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
>> + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:251
>> + RIP: 0033:0x7fdd79df99da
>> + RSP: 002b:00007fff2229bdf8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af
>> + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c408121190 RCX: 00007fdd79df99da
>> + RDX: 00007fdd7a0b8f88 RSI: 0000000000055670 RDI: 00007fdd7a47e000
>> + RBP: 000055c4081200b0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
>> + R10: 00007fdd79df5d0a R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fdd7a0b8f88
>> + R13: 000055c408120090 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
>> +
>> + Allocated by task 2734:
>> + save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:176
>> + set_track+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:188
>> + kasan_kmalloc+0x9a/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:372
>> + kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xcd/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:2761
>> + kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:512
>> + kmalloc_oob_right+0x56/0xbc [test_kasan] lib/test_kasan.c:36
>> + kmalloc_tests_init+0x16/0x769 [test_kasan]
>> + do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x240 init/main.c:832
>> + do_init_module+0x1b6/0x542 kernel/module.c:3462
>> + load_module+0x6042/0x9030 kernel/module.c:3786
>> + SYSC_init_module+0x18f/0x1c0 kernel/module.c:3858
>> + SyS_init_module+0x9/0x10 kernel/module.c:3841
>> + do_syscall_64+0x198/0x480 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
>> + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:251
>> +
>> + The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800696f3cc0
>> + which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
>> + The buggy address is located 123 bytes inside of
>> + 128-byte region [ffff8800696f3cc0, ffff8800696f3d40)
>> + The buggy address belongs to the page:
>> + page:ffffea0001a5bcc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
>> + flags: 0x100000000000100(slab)
>> + raw: 0100000000000100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180150015
>> + raw: ffffea0001a8ce40 0000000300000003 ffff88006d001640 0000000000000000
>> + page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>> +
>> Memory state around the buggy address:
>> - ffff8800693bc300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> - ffff8800693bc380: fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc
>> - ffff8800693bc400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> - ffff8800693bc480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> - ffff8800693bc500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00
>> - >ffff8800693bc580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fc fc fc fc fc
>> - ^
>> - ffff8800693bc600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> - ffff8800693bc680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> - ffff8800693bc700: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> - ffff8800693bc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> - ffff8800693bc800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> + ffff8800696f3c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc
>> + ffff8800696f3c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>> + >ffff8800696f3d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> + ^
>> + ffff8800696f3d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc
>> + ffff8800696f3e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> ==================================================================
>>
>> -The header of the report discribe what kind of bug happened and what kind of
>> -access caused it. It's followed by the description of the accessed slub object
>> -(see 'SLUB Debug output' section in Documentation/vm/slub.txt for details) and
>> -the description of the accessed memory page.
>> +The header of the report provides a short summary of what kind of bug happened
>> +and what kind of access caused it. It's followed by a stack trace of the bad
>> +access, a stack trace of where the accessed memory was allocated (in case bad
>> +access happens on a slab object), and a stack trace of where the object was
>> +freed (in case of a use-after-free bug report). Next comes a description of
>> +the accessed slab object and information about the accessed memory page.
>>
>> In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address.
>> Reading this part requires some understanding of how KASAN works.
>> @@ -138,18 +142,24 @@ inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
>> In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that
>> the accessed address is partially accessible.
>>
>> +For KHWASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed
>> +address (see Implementation details section).
>> +
>>
>> Implementation details
>> ----------------------
>>
>> +Classic KASAN
>> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> +
>> From a high level, our approach to memory error detection is similar to that
>> of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe
>> -to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to check shadow memory on each
>> -memory access.
>> +to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to insert checks of shadow
>> +memory on each memory access.
>>
>> -AddressSanitizer dedicates 1/8 of kernel memory to its shadow memory
>> -(e.g. 16TB to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and
>> -offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
>> +Classic KASAN dedicates 1/8th of kernel memory to its shadow memory (e.g. 16TB
>> +to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to
>> +translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
>>
>> Here is the function which translates an address to its corresponding shadow
>> address::
>> @@ -162,12 +172,34 @@ address::
>>
>> where ``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3``.
>>
>> -Compile-time instrumentation used for checking memory accesses. Compiler inserts
>> -function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory
>> -access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory access is
>> -valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
>> +Compile-time instrumentation is used to insert memory accesses checks. Compiler
>
> memory access checks.
>
>> +inserts function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each
>> +memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory
>> +access is valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
>>
>> GCC 5.0 has possibility to perform inline instrumentation. Instead of making
>> function calls GCC directly inserts the code to check the shadow memory.
>> This option significantly enlarges kernel but it gives x1.1-x2 performance
>> boost over outline instrumented kernel.
>> +
>> +KHWASAN
>> +~~~~~~~
>> +
>> +KHWASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of modern arm64 CPUs to store
>> +a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. KHWASAN also uses shadow
>> +memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory cell (therefore
>> +it dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory).
>> +
>> +On each memory allocation KHWASAN generates a random tag, tags allocated memory
>> +with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned pointer. KHWASAN uses
>> +compile-time instrumentation to insert checks before each memory access. These
>> +checks make sure that tag of the memory that is being accessed is equal to tag
>> +ofthe pointer that is used to access this memory. In case of a tag mismatch
>
> of the
>
>> +KHWASAN prints a bug report.
>> +
>> +KHWASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, that emits callbacks to
>> +check memory accesses; and inline, that performs the shadow memory checks
>> +inline). With outline instrumentation mode, a bug report is simply printed
>> +from the function that performs the access check. With inline instrumentation
>> +a brk instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a dedicated brk handler is
>> +used to print KHWASAN reports.
>>
>
> thanks,
> --
> ~Randy
Hi Randy,
Will fix all in v3.
Thanks!
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-28 12:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-20 14:46 [RFC PATCH v3 00/15] khwasan: kernel hardware assisted address sanitizer Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/15] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/15] khwasan: add CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_HW Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/15] khwasan, arm64: adjust shadow size for CONFIG_KASAN_HW Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/15] khwasan: initialize shadow to 0xff Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/15] khwasan, arm64: untag virt address in __kimg_to_phys Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/15] khwasan, arm64: fix up fault handling logic Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/15] khwasan: add tag related helper functions Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/15] khwasan, arm64: enable top byte ignore for the kernel Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/15] khwasan, mm: perform untagged pointers comparison in krealloc Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/15] khwasan: split out kasan_report.c from report.c Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/15] khwasan: add bug reporting routines Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/15] khwasan: add hooks implementation Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/15] khwasan, arm64: add brk handler for inline instrumentation Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/15] khwasan, mm, arm64: tag non slab memory allocated via pagealloc Andrey Konovalov
2018-04-20 14:46 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/15] khwasan: update kasan documentation Andrey Konovalov
2018-05-26 3:23 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-28 12:21 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
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