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From: "Thiébaud Weksteen" <tweek@google.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	 Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
	Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,  Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>,
	Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>,
	 Isaac Manjarres <isaacmanjarres@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] memfd,selinux: call security_inode_init_security_anon
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2025 08:51:12 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+zpnLdbLjuGrk-178coxAH1pzpEA1jRzGn8zU9DHZ1rQspP4A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEjxPJ6QfUZijh3PEpHs_Yw6Hmte92-rg8gkvMw9cD=JxA+CMA@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Sep 9, 2025 at 2:27 AM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 7, 2025 at 9:34 PM Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > Prior to this change, no security hooks were called at the creation of a
> > memfd file. It means that, for SELinux as an example, it will receive
> > the default type of the filesystem that backs the in-memory inode. In
> > most cases, that would be tmpfs, but if MFD_HUGETLB is passed, it will
> > be hugetlbfs. Both can be considered implementation details of memfd.
> >
> > It also means that it is not possible to differentiate between a file
> > coming from memfd_create and a file coming from a standard tmpfs mount
> > point.
> >
> > Additionally, no permission is validated at creation, which differs from
> > the similar memfd_secret syscall.
> >
> > Call security_inode_init_security_anon during creation. This ensures
> > that the file is setup similarly to other anonymous inodes. On SELinux,
> > it means that the file will receive the security context of its task.
> >
> > The ability to limit fexecve on memfd has been of interest to avoid
> > potential pitfalls where /proc/self/exe or similar would be executed
> > [1][2]. Reuse the "execute_no_trans" and "entrypoint" access vectors,
> > similarly to the file class. These access vectors may not make sense for
> > the existing "anon_inode" class. Therefore, define and assign a new
> > class "memfd_file" to support such access vectors.
> >
> > Guard these changes behind a new policy capability named "memfd_class".
> >
> > [1] https://crbug.com/1305267
> > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> > Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
>
> When you revise a patch, you aren't supposed to retain other's tags
> since they haven't technically reviewed, agreed to, or tested the
> revised change.
> That said, I have now done so and thus these tags can remain!
>

I'm sorry for that. Thanks for the clarification, I wasn't sure what
the process was. And thanks for the review!


  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-08 22:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-08  1:34 Thiébaud Weksteen
2025-09-08 16:27 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-09-08 22:51   ` Thiébaud Weksteen [this message]
2025-09-08 16:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-09-09 21:10   ` Paul Moore
2025-09-09 21:32     ` Paul Moore

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