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From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
To: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	cl@linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2011 22:02:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <AANLkTimRN_=APe_PWMFe_6CHHC7psUbCYE-O0qc=mmYY@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1299262495.3062.298.camel@calx>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 847 bytes --]

On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 8:14 PM, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> wrote:
>> Of course, as you say, '/proc/meminfo' still does give you the trigger
>> for "oh, now somebody actually allocated a new page". That's totally
>> independent of slabinfo, though (and knowing the number of active
>> slabs would neither help nor hurt somebody who uses meminfo - you
>> might as well allocate new sockets in a loop, and use _only_ meminfo
>> to see when that allocated a new page).
>
> I think lying to the user is much worse than changing the permissions.
> The cost of the resulting confusion is WAY higher.

Yeah, maybe. I've attached a proof of concept patch that attempts to
randomize object layout in individual slabs. I'm don't completely
understand the attack vector so I don't make any claims if the patch
helps or not.

                        Pekka

[-- Attachment #2: slub-randomize.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 2313 bytes --]

From cd1e20fb8eb44627fa5ccebc8a2803c1fd7bf7ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2011 21:28:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] SLUB: Randomize object layout in slabs

Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
---
 mm/slub.c |   45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index e15aa7f..1837fe3 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/memory.h>
 #include <linux/math64.h>
 #include <linux/fault-inject.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/kmem.h>
 
@@ -1183,6 +1184,46 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 		s->ctor(object);
 }
 
+static bool setup_slab_randomized(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned long bitmap[8];
+	size_t bitmap_size;
+	void *last, *start;
+
+	bitmap_size = BITS_TO_LONGS(page->objects) * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(bitmap) * sizeof(unsigned long) < bitmap_size)
+		return false;
+
+	bitmap_fill(bitmap, page->objects);
+
+	start = page_address(page);
+
+	last = start;
+	while (!bitmap_empty(bitmap, page->objects)) {
+		unsigned long idx;
+		void *p;
+
+		idx	= get_random_int() % page->objects;
+
+		idx	= find_next_bit(bitmap, page->objects, idx);
+
+		if (idx >= page->objects)
+			continue;
+
+		clear_bit(idx, bitmap);
+
+		p = start + idx * s->size;
+		setup_object(s, page, last);
+		set_freepointer(s, last, p);
+		last = p;
+	}
+	setup_object(s, page, last);
+	set_freepointer(s, last, NULL);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 {
 	struct page *page;
@@ -1206,6 +1247,9 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_POISON))
 		memset(start, POISON_INUSE, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
 
+	if (setup_slab_randomized(s, page, flags))
+		goto done; 
+
 	last = start;
 	for_each_object(p, s, start, page->objects) {
 		setup_object(s, page, last);
@@ -1215,6 +1259,7 @@ static struct page *new_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	setup_object(s, page, last);
 	set_freepointer(s, last, NULL);
 
+done:
 	page->freelist = start;
 	page->inuse = 0;
 out:
-- 
1.7.0.4


  reply	other threads:[~2011-03-04 20:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-03-03 17:50 Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-03 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2011-03-03 18:29   ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-03 20:58 ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-03 21:16   ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-03 21:44     ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-03 22:30       ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-03 23:08         ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-04  0:32           ` Dave Hansen
2011-03-04  0:50         ` Theodore Tso
2011-03-04  6:52           ` Pekka Enberg
2011-03-04 17:36             ` Dave Hansen
2011-03-04 17:48               ` Linus Torvalds
2011-03-04 18:14                 ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-04 20:02                   ` Pekka Enberg [this message]
2011-03-04 20:31                     ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-04 20:42                       ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-04 20:56                         ` Pekka Enberg
2011-03-04 21:08                           ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-04 21:30                             ` Pekka Enberg
2011-03-04 21:44                               ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-04 22:10                                 ` Pekka Enberg
2011-03-04 22:14                                   ` Pekka Enberg
2011-03-04 23:02                                     ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-05 16:25                                       ` Ted Ts'o
2011-03-06 13:19                                         ` Alan Cox
2011-03-07 14:56                                           ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-07 16:02                                             ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-04 20:37                     ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-04 20:58                       ` Pekka Enberg
2011-03-04 21:10                         ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-06  0:42                           ` Jesper Juhl
2011-03-06  0:57                             ` Dan Rosenberg
2011-03-06  1:09                             ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-06  1:15                               ` Jesper Juhl
2011-03-07 16:40                                 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-03-04 21:12                         ` Matt Mackall
2011-03-04 11:58           ` Alan Cox
2011-03-07 14:19 [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 040 George Spelvin
2011-03-07 17:49 ` [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400 George Spelvin

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