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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 08:33:20 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9d621439-108b-db42-d5ea-b390748d243b@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c197dc02-b63a-eb45-8e52-275934177d7e@linux.ibm.com>

Hi Dov,

On 3/2/22 04:03, Dov Murik wrote:
> Hi Brijesh,
> 
> On 24/02/2022 18:56, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
>> with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
>> read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
>> snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
>> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.
>>
>> The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
>> specified through the platform_data.
>>
>> Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
>> report.
>>
>> See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
> 
> [...]
> 
>> +
>> +static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen)
>> +{
>> +	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
>> +
>> +	crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>> +	if (!crypto)
>> +		return NULL;
>> +
>> +	crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
>> +	if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm))
>> +		goto e_free;
> 
> 
> When trying this series, the sevguest module didn't load (and printed no
> error message).  After adding some debug messages, I found that the
> crypto_alloc_read() call returned an error.  I found out that
> CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM was disabled in my config.
> 
> Consider modifying sevguest/Kconfig to force it in:
> 
> 
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
> index 2be45820e86c..74ca1fe09437 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
> @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
>   config SEV_GUEST
>          tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver"
>          default m
> -       depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT && CRYPTO_AEAD2
> +       depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +       select CRYPTO_AEAD2
> +       select CRYPTO_GCM
>          help
>            SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with
>            the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
> 
> 
> 
> Another thing to consider is to add messages to the various error paths
> in snp_guest_probe().  Not sure what is the common practice in other modules.
> 

I am not sure about sparkling the error message on the various paths, 
but I agree with adding the 'select'.

If I happen to do v12, I will include it in my series; otherwise, the 
maintainer can pull your above fixup on top of it.

thanks for looking into it.

~Brijesh


  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-02 14:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-24 16:55 [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 19:38   ` [PATCH v11 3.1/45] " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 08/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 17/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 21/45] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:09   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-03 18:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <Yh3r1PSx/fjqoBB3@nazgul.tnic>
2022-03-02 14:25     ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]       ` <Yh+Jc20ed82Vyxge@nazgul.tnic>
2022-03-03  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 11:51   ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]     ` <20220304003157.diqytybw6gpwn5sa@amd.com>
2022-03-04  7:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-03-02 10:03   ` Dov Murik
2022-03-02 14:33     ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2022-03-03 17:33   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-04 13:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 15:23       ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-04 15:43         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 15:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-03 16:47     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 14:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 15:39         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 15:53           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 16:03             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 16:14               ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-03-02 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 16:09   ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-03-02 16:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-03 22:36       ` Borislav Petkov

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