From: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
To: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 12:18:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <939ac25a-096f-46b3-90c1-d8cd6a9e445e@os.amperecomputing.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8e4e5648-9b70-4257-92c5-14c60928e240@arm.com>
On 8/25/25 12:31 AM, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> On 21/08/2025 19:29, Yang Shi wrote:
>> Hi Kevin,
>>
>> On 8/15/25 1:54 AM, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
>>> This is a proposal to leverage protection keys (pkeys) to harden
>>> critical kernel data, by making it mostly read-only. The series includes
>>> a simple framework called "kpkeys" to manipulate pkeys for in-kernel
>>> use,
>>> as well as a page table hardening feature based on that framework,
>>> "kpkeys_hardened_pgtables". Both are implemented on arm64 as a proof of
>>> concept, but they are designed to be compatible with any architecture
>>> that supports pkeys.
>> [...]
>>
>>> Note: the performance impact of set_memory_pkey() is likely to be
>>> relatively low on arm64 because the linear mapping uses PTE-level
>>> descriptors only. This means that set_memory_pkey() simply changes the
>>> attributes of some PTE descriptors. However, some systems may be able to
>>> use higher-level descriptors in the future [5], meaning that
>>> set_memory_pkey() may have to split mappings. Allocating page tables
>> I'm supposed the page table hardening feature will be opt-in due to
>> its overhead? If so I think you can just keep kernel linear mapping
>> using PTE, just like debug page alloc.
> Indeed, I don't expect it to be turned on by default (in defconfig). If
> the overhead proves too large when block mappings are used, it seems
> reasonable to force PTE mappings when kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is enabled.
>
>>> from a contiguous cache of pages could help minimise the overhead, as
>>> proposed for x86 in [1].
>> I'm a little bit confused about how this can work. The contiguous
>> cache of pages should be some large page, for example, 2M. But the
>> page table pages allocated from the cache may have different
>> permissions if I understand correctly. The default permission is RO,
>> but some of them may become R/W at sometime, for example, when calling
>> set_pte_at(). You still need to split the linear mapping, right?
> When such a helper is called, *all* PTPs become writeable - there is no
> per-PTP permission switching.
OK, so all PTPs in the same contiguous cache will become writeable even
though the helper (i.e. set_pte_at()) is just called on one of the
PTPs. But doesn't it compromise the page table hardening somehow? The
PTPs from the same cache may belong to different processes.
Thanks,
Yang
>
> PTPs remain mapped RW (i.e. the base permissions set at the PTE level
> are RW). With this series, they are also all mapped with the same pkey
> (1). By default, the pkey register is configured so that pkey 1 provides
> RO access. The net result is that PTPs are RO by default, since the pkey
> restricts the effective permissions.
>
> When calling e.g. set_pte(), the pkey register is modified to enable RW
> access to pkey 1, making it possible to write to any PTP. Its value is
> restored when the function exit so that PTPs are once again RO.
>
> - Kevin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-26 19:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-15 8:54 Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/18] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/18] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/18] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/18] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/18] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/18] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/18] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/18] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-11-28 16:44 ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-12-01 9:19 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/18] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 16:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-18 16:02 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-18 17:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-19 9:35 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-10-01 15:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-01 17:22 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/18] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/18] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/18] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/18] arm64: mm: Batch kpkeys level switches Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:01 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-21 7:23 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-21 17:29 ` Yang Shi
2025-08-25 7:31 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-26 19:18 ` Yang Shi [this message]
2025-08-27 16:09 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-29 22:31 ` Yang Shi
2025-09-18 14:15 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 14:57 ` Will Deacon
2025-10-01 12:22 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 17:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-01 12:41 ` Kevin Brodsky
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=939ac25a-096f-46b3-90c1-d8cd6a9e445e@os.amperecomputing.com \
--to=yang@os.amperecomputing.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david@redhat.com \
--cc=ira.weiny@intel.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jeffxu@chromium.org \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=mbland@motorola.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=pierre.langlois@arm.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=ryan.roberts@arm.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox