From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] lsm: introduce new hook security_vm_execstack
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 11:41:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8a2dc0a2-12c0-4389-a36d-8e8db0653fae@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJ2a_DfGHBuVBLTWniNektRsY_6P=x37XT-31+P6mV9dgJvt0Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 3/15/2024 11:30 AM, Christian Göttsche wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Mar 2024 at 19:22, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 3/15/2024 11:08 AM, Christian Göttsche wrote:
>>> Add a new hook guarding instantiations of programs with executable
>>> stack. They are being warned about since commit 47a2ebb7f505 ("execve:
>>> warn if process starts with executable stack"). Lets give LSMs the
>>> ability to control their presence on a per application basis.
>> This seems like a hideously expensive way to implement a flag
>> disallowing execution of programs with executable stacks. What's
>> wrong with adding a flag VM_NO_EXECUTABLE_STACK?
> That would be global and not on a per application basis.
> One might want to exempt known legacy programs.
OK, I can see that.
> Also is performance a concern for this today's rare occurrence?
Performance is *always* a concern. You're adding a new hook list
for a "rare" case. You're extended SELinux policy to include the
case. This really should be a hardening feature, not an SELinux policy
feature. The hook makes no sense for an LSM like Smack, which only
implements subject+object controls. You could implement a stand alone
LSM that implements only this hook, but again, it's not really access
control, it's hardening.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-15 18:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-15 18:08 [RFC PATCH 2/2] selinux: wire up new execstack LSM hook Christian Göttsche
2024-03-15 18:08 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] lsm: introduce new hook security_vm_execstack Christian Göttsche
2024-03-15 18:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-15 18:30 ` Christian Göttsche
2024-03-15 18:41 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2024-03-15 20:22 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-16 3:24 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-19 23:10 ` Paul Moore
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