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From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>,
	Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] mm: avoid unnecessary flush on change_huge_pmd()
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8BC74789-FF33-403F-B5D7-19034CAC7EE6@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <435f41f2-ffd4-0278-9f26-fbe2c2c7545c@intel.com>



> On Oct 26, 2021, at 11:44 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> On 10/26/21 10:44 AM, Nadav Amit wrote:
>>> "If software on one logical processor writes to a page while software on
>>> another logical processor concurrently clears the R/W flag in the
>>> paging-structure entry that maps the page, execution on some processors may
>>> result in the entry’s dirty flag being set (due to the write on the first
>>> logical processor) and the entry’s R/W flag being clear (due to the update
>>> to the entry on the second logical processor). This will never occur on a
>>> processor that supports control-flow enforcement technology (CET)”
>>> 
>>> So I guess that this optimization can only be enabled when CET is enabled.
>>> 
>>> :(
>> I still wonder whether the SDM comment applies to present bit vs dirty
>> bit atomicity as well.
> 
> I think it's implicit.  From "4.8 ACCESSED AND DIRTY FLAGS":
> 
> 	"Whenever there is a write to a linear address, the processor
> 	 sets the dirty flag (if it is not already set) in the paging-
> 	 structure entry"
> 
> There can't be a "write to a linear address" without a Present=1 PTE.
> If it were a Dirty=1,Present=1 PTE, there's no race because there might
> not be a write to the PTE at all.
> 
> There's also this from the "4.10.4.3 Optional Invalidation" section:
> 
> 	"no TLB entry or paging-structure cache entry is created with
> 	 information from a paging-structure entry in which the P flag
> 	 is 0."
> 
> That means that we don't have to worry about the TLB doing something
> bonkers like caching a Dirty=1 bit from a Present=0 PTE.
> 
> Is that what you were worried about?

Thanks Dave, but no - that is not my concern.

To make it very clear - consider the following scenario, in which
a volatile pointer p is mapped using a certain PTE, which is RW
(i.e., *p is writable):

  CPU0				CPU1
  ----				----
  x = *p
  [ PTE cached in TLB; 
    PTE is not dirty ]
				clear_pte(PTE)
  *p = x
  [ needs to set dirty ]

Note that there is no TLB flush in this scenario. The question
is whether the write access to *p would succeed, setting the
dirty bit on the clear, non-present entry.

I was under the impression that the hardware AD-assist would
recheck the PTE atomically as it sets the dirty bit. But, as I
said, I am not sure anymore whether this is defined architecturally
(or at least would work in practice on all CPUs modulo the 
Knights Landing thingy).



  reply	other threads:[~2021-10-26 19:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-21 12:21 [PATCH v2 0/5] mm/mprotect: avoid unnecessary TLB flushes Nadav Amit
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86: Detection of Knights Landing A/D leak Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 15:54   ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 15:57     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] mm: avoid unnecessary flush on change_huge_pmd() Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 10:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 16:29     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 16:06   ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 16:47     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 16:53       ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 17:44       ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 18:44         ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 19:06           ` Nadav Amit [this message]
2021-10-26 19:40             ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-26 20:07               ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 20:47                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/mm: check exec permissions on fault Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 10:59   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 11:13     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-10-25 14:23     ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 16:19     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 17:45       ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 17:51         ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 18:00           ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] mm/mprotect: use mmu_gather Nadav Amit
2021-10-21 12:21 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] mm/mprotect: do not flush on permission promotion Nadav Amit
2021-10-25 11:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 16:27     ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-22  3:04 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] mm/mprotect: avoid unnecessary TLB flushes Andrew Morton
2021-10-22 21:58   ` Nadav Amit
2021-10-26 16:09     ` Dave Hansen
2021-10-25 10:50   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-10-25 16:42     ` Nadav Amit

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