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From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, "Shutemov,
	Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [LSF/MM TOPIC] Impact on core mm from new hardware features
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2021 21:38:18 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y2ayyy1h.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51d3010b-6324-2441-42c0-27bb536c897d@intel.com>

Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> writes:
> I'd like to have a session about new hardware features that may will
> have an impact on core memory management.  This session would have two
> goals: one to ensure that the OS-agnostic MM crowd understands what the
> architectures are going to be throwing their way.  Second, that the
> different arch-specific folks can look for commonalities which could
> enable shared infrastructure.
>
> There should be enough x86 folks around, but I'd love to hear from the
> ARM and powerpc people as well.

Cc += Aneesh and Nick

I can't think of anything publicly announced for Power that will have a
big impact on core mm, but Nick & Aneesh might have ideas.

cheers

> Here are a few mostly Intel-specific things I'd like to discuss.
> However, all of these either have analogs on other architectures or are
> implemented by other x86 vendors.
>
>  * Shadow Stacks - requires new Copy-on-Read memory type.  Creates
>    application mappings which are effectively PROT_NONE, but which are
>    implicitly accessible by the hardware.
>  * Linear Address Masking (LAM) - Similar to ARM's Top Byte Ignore
>    (TBI).  Repurpose some virtual address bits to store metadata.  Intel
>    implementation can sacrifice user address space.  Offloads some of
>    the work the compiler does in ASAN implementations.
>  * Supervisor Protection Keys - Extends Memory Protection Keys (pkeys)
>    to kernel mappings.
>  * TDX - VMs that don't trust the hypervisor.  Requires unmapping guest
>    memory from userspace and possibly the host kernel.





  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-25 11:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-22 14:55 Dave Hansen
2021-06-22 15:00 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-06-22 16:19 ` [Lsf-pc] " Dan Williams
2021-06-25 11:38 ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2021-06-25 22:34   ` Ira Weiny

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