From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH 07/22] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 15:55:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87woy414vt.fsf@e105922-lin.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180305162610.37510-8-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (Kirill A. Shutemov's message of "Mon, 5 Mar 2018 19:25:55 +0300")
Hi Kirill,
A flyby comment below.
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> writes:
> MKTME claims several upper bits of the physical address in a page table
> entry to encode KeyID. It effectively shrinks number of bits for
> physical address. We should exclude KeyID bits from physical addresses.
>
> For instance, if CPU enumerates 52 physical address bits and number of
> bits claimed for KeyID is 6, bits 51:46 must not be threated as part
> physical address.
>
> This patch adjusts __PHYSICAL_MASK during MKTME enumeration.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> index c770689490b5..35436bbadd0b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> @@ -580,6 +580,30 @@ static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
> + if (mktme_status == MKTME_ENABLED && nr_keyids) {
> + /*
> + * Mask out bits claimed from KeyID from physical address mask.
> + *
> + * For instance, if a CPU enumerates 52 physical address bits
> + * and number of bits claimed for KeyID is 6, bits 51:46 of
> + * physical address is unusable.
> + */
> + phys_addr_t keyid_mask;
> +
> + keyid_mask = 1ULL << c->x86_phys_bits;
> + keyid_mask -= 1ULL << (c->x86_phys_bits - keyid_bits);
> + physical_mask &= ~keyid_mask;
You could use GENMASK_ULL() to construct the keyid_mask instead of
rolling your own here.
Thanks,
Punit
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * Reset __PHYSICAL_MASK.
> + * Maybe needed if there's inconsistent configuation
> + * between CPUs.
> + */
> + physical_mask = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
> + }
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Exclude KeyID bits from physical address bits.
> *
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-22 15:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-05 16:25 [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 01/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel Total Memory Encryption cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 02/22] x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 03/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel PCONFIG cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 04/22] x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 05/22] x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 06/22] x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 07/22] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 15:55 ` Punit Agrawal [this message]
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 08/22] mm: Introduce __GFP_ENCRYPT Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 16:02 ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 09/22] mm, rmap: Add arch-specific field into anon_vma Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 10/22] mm/shmem: Zero out unused vma fields in shmem_pseudo_vma_init() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 11/22] mm: Use __GFP_ENCRYPT for pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 12/22] mm: Do no merge vma with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 13/22] mm, rmap: Free encrypted pages once mapcount drops to zero Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 15:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 14/22] mm, khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 15/22] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 16/22] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 17/22] x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 18/22] x86/mm: Handle allocation of encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:03 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:36 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 19/22] x86/mm: Implement free_encrypt_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:00 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:38 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 13:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:09 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-20 12:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-27 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 20/22] x86/mm: Implement anon_vma_encrypted() and anon_vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 21/22] x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 17:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:56 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 15:04 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 22/22] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 18:30 ` [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Christoph Hellwig
2018-03-05 19:05 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-06 8:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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