linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	 Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	 Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,  Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	 Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	 James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	 Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
	 Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>,
	 Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,  Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,  linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	 tiozhang <tiozhang@didiglobal.com>,
	 Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	 "Paulo Alcantara (SUSE)" <pc@manguebit.com>,
	 Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
	 Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
	YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>,
	 Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	 Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>, Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>,
	 xu xin <xu.xin16@zte.com.cn>,  Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	 Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,  David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	 Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>,
	 Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	 David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
	 Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>,
	 Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	 "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>,
	 Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>,
	 Penglei Jiang <superman.xpt@gmail.com>,
	 Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
	 Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	 "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	 Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2025 11:29:14 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wm3ky5n9.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87tsyozqdu.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 20 Nov 2025 09:15:57 -0600")

"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> writes:

> Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> writes:
>
>> This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to
>> fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads
>> is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock
>> in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the
>> tracer to continue execution.
>
> A small quibble it isn't a dead lock.  It isn't even really a live lock,
> as it is possible to SIGKILL our way out.
>
> Thinking about this there is a really silly and simple way we can deal
> with this situation for PTRACE_ATTACH.  We can send SIGSTOP and wait for
> the thread to stop before doing anything with cred_guard_mutex.
>
> PTRACE_ATTACH already implies sending SIGSTOP so as long as we have
> enough permissions to send SIGSTOP I don't see that being a problem.
>
> The worst case I can see is that we get a case where we stop the
> process, the permission check fails under cred_guard_mutex and
> and ptrace attach has fails and has to send SIGCONT to undo it's
> premature SIGSTOP.  That might almost be visible, but it would still
> be legitimate because we can still check that we have permission to
> send SIGSTOP.

Bah no I am full of it.

The challenging behavior is in the semantics of the kernel operations.
We need to describe it as such please.

It is the same class of problem as a single threaded process calls exec
with a pipe attached to both stdin and stdout of the new process.

For the stdin and stdout we can say just use pull and nonblocking I/O.

The problem is that both PTRACE_ATTACH and PTRACE_SEIZE block over
the duration of exec, and if exec is waiting for a thread to exit,
and that thread is blocked in PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT waiting for that very
same tracer those processes will hang. Not deadlock.


I haven't seen anyone clearly describe the problem lately so I am
repeating it.


Just looking at the code I don't think there is any fundamental reason
to call commit_creds after de_thread.  If we can change that we can sort
this out without any change in userspace semantics.

If we can't move commit_creds we have to either give
PTRACE_ATTACH/PTRACE_SEIZE a non-block mode, or break out of
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT in de_thread.

I will post a proof of concept of moving commit_creds in just a minute.

Eric


  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-20 17:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <AM8PR10MB470801D01A0CF24BC32C25E7E40E9@AM8PR10MB4708.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
     [not found] ` <AM8PR10MB470875B22B4C08BEAEC3F77FE4169@AM8PR10MB4708.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
2023-10-30  5:20   ` [PATCH v12] " Bernd Edlinger
2023-10-30  9:00     ` kernel test robot
     [not found]     ` <AS8P193MB12851AC1F862B97FCE9B3F4FE4AAA@AS8P193MB1285.EURP193.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
2024-01-15 19:22       ` [PATCH v14] " Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-15 19:37         ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-01-17  9:51           ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-16 15:22         ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-01-17 15:07           ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-17 16:38             ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-01-22 13:24               ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-22 13:44                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-01-22 21:30                 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:30                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-24  0:09                     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]         ` <AS8P193MB1285937F9831CECAF2A9EEE2E4752@AS8P193MB1285.EURP193.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
2025-08-18  6:04           ` [PATCH v15] " Jain, Ayush
2025-08-18 20:53           ` [PATCH v16] " Bernd Edlinger
2025-08-19  4:36             ` Kees Cook
2025-08-19 18:53               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-08-21 17:34             ` [PATCH v17] " Bernd Edlinger
2025-10-27  6:26               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-10-27 12:06               ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-02 16:17               ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-05 14:32               ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-11  9:21                 ` Christian Brauner
2025-11-11 11:07                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-11 13:12                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-11 13:45                       ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-12  9:52                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-17  6:31                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-17 15:01                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-17 20:08                       ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-23 18:32                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-29 15:06                           ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-01 15:13                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:14               ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] mt-exec: fix deadlock with ptrace_attach() Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:14                 ` [RFC PATCH 1/3] exec: make setup_new_exec() return int Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:15                 ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] exec: don't wait for zombie threads with cred_guard_mutex held Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-10 10:58                   ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2025-11-10 15:09                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-10 21:49                       ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2025-11-11 14:09                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:16                 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] ptrace: ensure PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT won't stop if the tracee is killed by exec Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-10  5:28                 ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] mt-exec: fix deadlock with ptrace_attach() Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-10 14:47                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-18 18:13               ` [PATCH v18] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-20 15:15                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-20 17:29                   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2025-11-20 20:57                     ` [RFC][PATCH] exec: Move cred computation under exec_update_lock Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-20 23:50                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-21  2:59                         ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-21  7:18                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-21  9:35                             ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-21 11:26                               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-21 19:19                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-21 23:06                                   ` Ryan Lee
2025-11-23 18:52                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-23 23:22                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-25 16:19                           ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-25 11:55                       ` Roberto Sassu
2025-12-01 16:06                         ` Are setuid shell scripts safe? (Implied by security_bprm_creds_for_exec) Eric W. Biederman
2025-12-01 16:49                           ` Roberto Sassu
2025-12-01 18:53                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-12-01 21:39                               ` David Laight
2025-12-03 13:16                               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-04  5:49                                 ` Al Viro
2025-12-04  9:32                                   ` David Laight
2025-12-04 13:03                                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-04 15:43                           ` Stephen Smalley
2025-11-22 17:10                     ` [PATCH v18] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach Bernd Edlinger

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87wm3ky5n9.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org \
    --to=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
    --cc=adrian.ratiu@collabora.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=areber@redhat.com \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
    --cc=bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=chao@kernel.org \
    --cc=cyphar@cyphar.com \
    --cc=david@redhat.com \
    --cc=dchinner@redhat.com \
    --cc=deller@gmx.de \
    --cc=dwindsor@gmail.com \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=frederic@kernel.org \
    --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
    --cc=ishkamiel@gmail.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jamorris@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
    --cc=joel@joelfernandes.org \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=laoar.shao@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
    --cc=mhocko@suse.com \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=mjguzik@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=pc@manguebit.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=senozhatsky@chromium.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=shr@devkernel.io \
    --cc=shuah@kernel.org \
    --cc=superman.xpt@gmail.com \
    --cc=surenb@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tiozhang@didiglobal.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=wad@chromium.org \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    --cc=xu.xin16@zte.com.cn \
    --cc=yuehaibing@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox