From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: 'Andy Lutomirski' <luto@kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jorge Merlino <jorge.merlino@canonical.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>,
Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com" <apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs/exec: Explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 11:49:07 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sfi3rmuk.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d2a6ccdd8a734d36ae88866a4c16019b@AcuMS.aculab.com> (David Laight's message of "Fri, 14 Oct 2022 22:03:18 +0000")
David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> writes:
> From: Andy Lutomirski
>> Sent: 14 October 2022 04:18
> ...
>> But seriously, this makes no sense at all. It should not be possible to exec a program and then,
>> without ptrace, change its cwd out from under it. Do we really need to preserve this behavior?
>
> it maybe ok if the exec'ed program also 'bought-in' to the
> fact that its cwd and open files might get changed.
> But imagine someone doing it to a login shell!
I am slowly catching up on my email and I saw this conversation.
When I initially saw this thread I was confused and thought this
might run into an issue with fs/locks.c. I was close but wrong.
fs/locks.c uses current->files as a sort of process identifier
and so is very sensitive to when it is unshared. Making
unsharing current->files unconditionally a bug. Not relevant to
this conversation.
There are several clone options that were only relevant for the old
LinuxThreads implementation including CLONE_FS and CLONE_SIGHAND.
The LinuxThreads implementation has not been needed since
the introduction of CLONE_THREAD in linux-2.6.0 in 17 Dec 2003.
Almost 20 years ago.
I suggest we introduce CONFIG_CLONE_FS and CONFIG_SIGHAND to allow
disabling support of these clone options. No known user space will
care. The are both getting in the way of kernel maintenance so there
is a reason to start pushing them out.
Further simply not worrying about UNSHARE_FS during exec fixes the
race so it essentially a bug fix by code removal.
I believe something like the patch below should get the job done.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a0b1f0337a62..7ff13c77ad04 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1186,7 +1186,8 @@ static int unshare_sighand(struct task_struct *me)
{
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = me->sighand;
- if (refcount_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CLONE_SIGHAND) &&
+ refcount_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
struct sighand_struct *newsighand;
/*
* This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND
@@ -1568,6 +1569,9 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (task_no_new_privs(current))
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CLONE_FS))
+ return;
+
t = p;
n_fs = 1;
spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 94125d3b6893..8660a6bcc1cf 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1764,6 +1764,23 @@ config KALLSYMS_BASE_RELATIVE
time constants, and no relocation pass is required at runtime to fix
up the entries based on the runtime load address of the kernel.
+config CLONE_FS
+ bool
+ default y
+ help
+ Support CLONE_FS being passed to clone. The only known user
+ is the old LinuxThreads package so it should be safe to disable
+ this option.
+
+config CLONE_SIGHAND
+ bool
+ default y
+ help
+ Support CLONE_SIGHAND being passed to clone. The only known user
+ is the old LinuxThreads package so it should be safe to disable
+ this option.
+
+
# end of the "standard kernel features (expert users)" menu
# syscall, maps, verifier
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 08969f5aa38d..da9017b51da4 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -2023,6 +2023,16 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ /* Don't allow CLONE_FS if not enabled */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CLONE_FS) &&
+ ((clone_flags & (CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_FS)) == CLONE_FS))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ /* Don't allow CLONE_SIGHAND if not enabled */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CLONE_SIGHAND) &&
+ ((clone_flags & (CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND)) == CLONE_SIGHAND))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
/*
* Siblings of global init remain as zombies on exit since they are
* not reaped by their parent (swapper). To solve this and to avoid
@@ -3101,6 +3111,9 @@ static int unshare_fs(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct fs_struct **new_fsp)
if (fs->users == 1)
return 0;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CLONE_FS))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
*new_fsp = copy_fs_struct(fs);
if (!*new_fsp)
return -ENOMEM;
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-28 17:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-06 8:27 [PATCH 0/2] " Kees Cook
2022-10-06 8:27 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Kees Cook
2022-10-06 9:05 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-06 10:48 ` David Laight
2022-10-06 14:13 ` Jann Horn
2022-10-06 15:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-06 15:35 ` Jann Horn
2025-05-13 13:05 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-05-13 15:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-13 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-13 21:09 ` Jann Horn
2025-05-13 22:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-14 0:03 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-05-14 15:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-14 15:42 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-15 16:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-13 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 3:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-14 3:54 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 15:35 ` Jann Horn
2022-10-18 7:09 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 11:19 ` Jann Horn
2022-10-14 22:03 ` David Laight
2022-11-28 17:49 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-10-06 8:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE Kees Cook
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