From: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-aio@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cachefs@redhat.com, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org,
samba-technical@lists.samba.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
serge@hallyn.com, amir73il@gmail.com, kernel-team@cloudflare.com,
Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] cred: Propagate security_prepare_creds() error code
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 11:06:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <859cb593-9e96-5846-2191-6613677b07c5@cloudflare.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87y1xzyhub.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>
On 6/13/22 11:44 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> writes:
>
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> On 6/13/22 12:04 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> While experimenting with the security_prepare_creds() LSM hook, we
>>>> noticed that our EPERM error code was not propagated up the callstack.
>>>> Instead ENOMEM is always returned. As a result, some tools may send a
>>>> confusing error message to the user:
>>>>
>>>> $ unshare -rU
>>>> unshare: unshare failed: Cannot allocate memory
>>>>
>>>> A user would think that the system didn't have enough memory, when
>>>> instead the action was denied.
>>>>
>>>> This problem occurs because prepare_creds() and prepare_kernel_cred()
>>>> return NULL when security_prepare_creds() returns an error code. Later,
>>>> functions calling prepare_creds() and prepare_kernel_cred() return
>>>> ENOMEM because they assume that a NULL meant there was no memory
>>>> allocated.
>>>>
>>>> Fix this by propagating an error code from security_prepare_creds() up
>>>> the callstack.
>>> Why would it make sense for security_prepare_creds to return an error
>>> code other than ENOMEM?
>>> > That seems a bit of a violation of what that function is supposed to do
>>>
>>
>> The API allows LSM authors to decide what error code is returned from the
>> cred_prepare hook. security_task_alloc() is a similar hook, and has its return
>> code propagated.
>
> It is not an api. It is an implementation detail of the linux kernel.
> It is a set of convenient functions that do a job.
>
> The general rule is we don't support cases without an in-tree user. I
> don't see an in-tree user.
>
>> I'm proposing we follow security_task_allocs() pattern, and add visibility for
>> failure cases in prepare_creds().
>
> I am asking why we would want to. Especially as it is not an API, and I
> don't see any good reason for anything but an -ENOMEM failure to be
> supported.
>
We're writing a LSM BPF policy, and not a new LSM. Our policy aims to
solve unprivileged unshare, similar to Debian's patch [1]. We're in a
position such that we can't use that patch because we can't block _all_
of our applications from performing an unshare. We prefer a granular
approach. LSM BPF seems like a good choice.
Because LSM BPF exposes these hooks, we should probably treat them as an
API. From that perspective, userspace expects unshare to return a EPERM
when the call is denied permissions.
> Without an in-tree user that cares it is probably better to go the
> opposite direction and remove the possibility of return anything but
> memory allocation failure. That will make it clearer to implementors
> that a general error code is not supported and this is not a location
> to implement policy, this is only a hook to allocate state for the LSM.
>
That's a good point, and it's possible we're using the wrong hook for
the policy. Do you know of other hooks we can look into?
>>> I have probably missed a very interesting discussion where that was
>>> mentioned but I don't see link to the discussion or anything explaining
>>> why we want to do that in this change.
>>>
>>
>> AFAIK, this is the start of the discussion.
>
> You were on v3 and had an out of tree piece of code so I assumed someone
> had at least thought about why you want to implement policy in a piece
> of code whose only purpose is to allocate memory to store state.
>
No worries.
> Eric
>
>
>
Links:
1:
https://sources.debian.org/patches/linux/3.16.56-1+deb8u1/debian/add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by-default.patch/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-14 16:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-08 15:09 Frederick Lawler
2022-06-09 23:18 ` Eric Biggers
2022-06-13 13:46 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-06-13 17:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-06-13 20:52 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-06-14 4:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-06-14 14:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-14 16:06 ` Frederick Lawler [this message]
2022-06-14 16:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-06-14 18:59 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-06-15 10:30 ` Christian Brauner
2022-06-15 14:14 ` Paul Moore
2022-06-15 15:06 ` Ignat Korchagin
2022-06-15 15:33 ` Paul Moore
2022-06-15 15:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-16 15:04 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-06-15 15:30 ` Casey Schaufler
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