From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
haitao.huang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 12:28:39 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <819b6d6a-64ea-d908-76ad-0a6366ed0d53@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202102101137.E109C9FE6@keescook>
On 2/10/2021 11:42 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 09:56:46AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> There is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes
>> (not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to
>> represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits.
>> They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0, Dirty=1.
>>
>> The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware
>> and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE. Software must
>> normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply
>> opt to not create them.
>>
>> In places where Linux normally creates Write=0, Dirty=1, it can use the
>> software-defined _PAGE_COW in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY. In other
>> words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0, Dirty=1, it instead creates
>> Write=0, Cow=1, except for shadow stack, which is Write=0, Dirty=1. This
>> clearly separates shadow stack from other data, and results in the
>> following:
>>
>> (a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (Write=0, Cow=1)
>> (b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (Write=0, Cow=1)
>> The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a writable
>> copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets
>> the new copy's PTE as Write=0 and Cow=1.
>> (c) A shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Dirty=1)
>> (d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Cow=1)
>> When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens
>> at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so the next shadow stack access
>> causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again.
>> This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's
>> copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
>> (e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set
>> Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE. That's possible today, but
>> will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.
>>
>> Define _PAGE_COW and update pte_*() helpers and apply the same changes to
>> pmd and pud.
>
> I still find this commit confusing mostly due to _PAGE_COW being 0
> without CET enabled. Shouldn't this just get changed universally? Why
> should this change depend on CET?
>
For example, in...
static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)
{
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
return pte_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY);
else
return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW;
}
There are four cases:
(a) RW=1, Dirty=1 -> writable
(b) RW=1, Dirty=0 -> writable
(c) RW=0, Dirty=0 -> not writable
(d) RW=0, Dirty=1 -> shadow stack, or not-writable if !X86_FEATURE_SHSTK
Case (d) is ture only when shadow stack is enabled, otherwise it is not
writable. With shadow stack feature, the usual dirty, copy-on-write PTE
becomes RW=0, Cow=1.
We can get this changed universally, but all usual dirty, copy-on-write
PTEs need the Dirty/Cow swapping, always. Is that desirable?
--
Yu-cheng
[...]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-10 20:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-10 17:56 [PATCH v20 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:33 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 19:40 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 19:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:35 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:42 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 20:28 ` Yu, Yu-cheng [this message]
2021-02-15 16:49 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:56 ` [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:58 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 21:38 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-11 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 17:57 ` [PATCH v20 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-10 19:46 ` Kees Cook
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