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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Fares Mehanna <faresx@amazon.de>
Cc: nh-open-source@amazon.com, "Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Oliver Upton" <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
	"Suzuki K Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	"Zenghui Yu" <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Kemeng Shi" <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>,
	"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Javier Martinez Canillas" <javierm@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Fuad Tabba" <tabba@google.com>,
	"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	"Kristina Martsenko" <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Bjorn Helgaas" <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	"Jean-Philippe Brucker" <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Roman Kagan" <rkagan@amazon.de>,
	"moderated list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)"
	<kvmarm@lists.linux.dev>,
	"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:MEMORY MANAGEMENT" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] support for mm-local memory allocations and use it
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2024 14:59:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <813b9bcb-afde-40b6-a604-cdb71b4b6d7a@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240911143421.85612-1-faresx@amazon.de>

On 11.09.24 16:33, Fares Mehanna wrote:
> In a series posted a few years ago [1], a proposal was put forward to allow the
> kernel to allocate memory local to a mm and thus push it out of reach for
> current and future speculation-based cross-process attacks.  We still believe
> this is a nice thing to have.
> 
> However, in the time passed since that post Linux mm has grown quite a few new
> goodies, so we'd like to explore possibilities to implement this functionality
> with less effort and churn leveraging the now available facilities.
> 
> An RFC was posted few months back [2] to show the proof of concept and a simple
> test driver.
> 
> In this RFC, we're using the same approach of implementing mm-local allocations
> piggy-backing on memfd_secret(), using regular user addresses but pinning the
> pages and flipping the user/supervisor flag on the respective PTEs to make them
> directly accessible from kernel.
> In addition to that we are submitting 5 patches to use the secret memory to hide
> the vCPU gp-regs and fp-regs on arm64 VHE systems.

I'm a bit lost on what exactly we want to achieve. The point where we 
start flipping user/supervisor flags confuses me :)

With secretmem, you'd get memory allocated that
(a) Is accessible by user space -- mapped into user space.
(b) Is inaccessible by kernel space -- not mapped into the direct map
(c) GUP will fail, but copy_from / copy_to user will work.


Another way, without secretmem, would be to consider these "secrets" 
kernel allocations that can be mapped into user space using mmap() of a 
special fd. That is, they wouldn't have their origin in secretmem, but 
in KVM as a kernel allocation. It could be achieved by using VM_MIXEDMAP 
with vm_insert_pages(), manually removing them from the directmap.

But, I am not sure who is supposed to access what. Let's explore the 
requirements. I assume we want:

(a) Pages accessible by user space -- mapped into user space.
(b) Pages inaccessible by kernel space -- not mapped into the direct map
(c) GUP to fail (no direct map).
(d) copy_from / copy_to user to fail?

And on top of that, some way to access these pages on demand from kernel 
space? (temporary CPU-local mapping?)

Or how would the kernel make use of these allocations?

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-09-27 12:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-11 14:33 Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] mseal: expose interface to seal / unseal user memory ranges Fares Mehanna
2024-09-12 16:40   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-09-25 15:25     ` Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] mm/secretmem: implement mm-local kernel allocations Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] arm64: KVM: Refactor C-code to access vCPU gp-registers through macros Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] KVM: Refactor Assembly-code to access vCPU gp-registers through a macro Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] arm64: KVM: Allocate vCPU gp-regs dynamically on VHE and KERNEL_SECRETMEM enabled systems Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 6/7] arm64: KVM: Refactor C-code to access vCPU fp-registers through macros Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] arm64: KVM: Allocate vCPU fp-regs dynamically on VHE and KERNEL_SECRETMEM enabled systems Fares Mehanna
2024-09-20 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH 0/7] support for mm-local memory allocations and use it Mike Rapoport
2024-09-25 15:33   ` Fares Mehanna
2024-09-27  7:08     ` Mike Rapoport
2024-10-08 20:06       ` Fares Mehanna
2024-09-20 13:19 ` Alexander Graf
2024-09-27 12:59 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2024-10-10 15:52   ` Fares Mehanna
2024-10-11 12:04     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-11 12:36       ` Mediouni, Mohamed
2024-10-11 12:56         ` Mediouni, Mohamed
2024-10-11 12:58           ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-11 14:25             ` Fares Mehanna
2024-10-18 18:52               ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-18 19:02                 ` David Hildenbrand

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