From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Fares Mehanna <faresx@amazon.de>
Cc: nh-open-source@amazon.com, "Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
"Oliver Upton" <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
"Suzuki K Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
"Zenghui Yu" <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kemeng Shi" <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>,
"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Javier Martinez Canillas" <javierm@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Fuad Tabba" <tabba@google.com>,
"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
"Kristina Martsenko" <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Bjorn Helgaas" <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Jean-Philippe Brucker" <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Roman Kagan" <rkagan@amazon.de>,
"moderated list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)"
<kvmarm@lists.linux.dev>,
"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:MEMORY MANAGEMENT" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] support for mm-local memory allocations and use it
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2024 14:59:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <813b9bcb-afde-40b6-a604-cdb71b4b6d7a@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240911143421.85612-1-faresx@amazon.de>
On 11.09.24 16:33, Fares Mehanna wrote:
> In a series posted a few years ago [1], a proposal was put forward to allow the
> kernel to allocate memory local to a mm and thus push it out of reach for
> current and future speculation-based cross-process attacks. We still believe
> this is a nice thing to have.
>
> However, in the time passed since that post Linux mm has grown quite a few new
> goodies, so we'd like to explore possibilities to implement this functionality
> with less effort and churn leveraging the now available facilities.
>
> An RFC was posted few months back [2] to show the proof of concept and a simple
> test driver.
>
> In this RFC, we're using the same approach of implementing mm-local allocations
> piggy-backing on memfd_secret(), using regular user addresses but pinning the
> pages and flipping the user/supervisor flag on the respective PTEs to make them
> directly accessible from kernel.
> In addition to that we are submitting 5 patches to use the secret memory to hide
> the vCPU gp-regs and fp-regs on arm64 VHE systems.
I'm a bit lost on what exactly we want to achieve. The point where we
start flipping user/supervisor flags confuses me :)
With secretmem, you'd get memory allocated that
(a) Is accessible by user space -- mapped into user space.
(b) Is inaccessible by kernel space -- not mapped into the direct map
(c) GUP will fail, but copy_from / copy_to user will work.
Another way, without secretmem, would be to consider these "secrets"
kernel allocations that can be mapped into user space using mmap() of a
special fd. That is, they wouldn't have their origin in secretmem, but
in KVM as a kernel allocation. It could be achieved by using VM_MIXEDMAP
with vm_insert_pages(), manually removing them from the directmap.
But, I am not sure who is supposed to access what. Let's explore the
requirements. I assume we want:
(a) Pages accessible by user space -- mapped into user space.
(b) Pages inaccessible by kernel space -- not mapped into the direct map
(c) GUP to fail (no direct map).
(d) copy_from / copy_to user to fail?
And on top of that, some way to access these pages on demand from kernel
space? (temporary CPU-local mapping?)
Or how would the kernel make use of these allocations?
--
Cheers,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-27 12:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-11 14:33 Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] mseal: expose interface to seal / unseal user memory ranges Fares Mehanna
2024-09-12 16:40 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-09-25 15:25 ` Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] mm/secretmem: implement mm-local kernel allocations Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] arm64: KVM: Refactor C-code to access vCPU gp-registers through macros Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] KVM: Refactor Assembly-code to access vCPU gp-registers through a macro Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] arm64: KVM: Allocate vCPU gp-regs dynamically on VHE and KERNEL_SECRETMEM enabled systems Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 6/7] arm64: KVM: Refactor C-code to access vCPU fp-registers through macros Fares Mehanna
2024-09-11 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] arm64: KVM: Allocate vCPU fp-regs dynamically on VHE and KERNEL_SECRETMEM enabled systems Fares Mehanna
2024-09-20 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH 0/7] support for mm-local memory allocations and use it Mike Rapoport
2024-09-25 15:33 ` Fares Mehanna
2024-09-27 7:08 ` Mike Rapoport
2024-10-08 20:06 ` Fares Mehanna
2024-09-20 13:19 ` Alexander Graf
2024-09-27 12:59 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2024-10-10 15:52 ` Fares Mehanna
2024-10-11 12:04 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-11 12:36 ` Mediouni, Mohamed
2024-10-11 12:56 ` Mediouni, Mohamed
2024-10-11 12:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-11 14:25 ` Fares Mehanna
2024-10-18 18:52 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-10-18 19:02 ` David Hildenbrand
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