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Mon, 30 Mar 2020 13:13:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.36.113.227] (ovpn-113-227.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.227]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C9295C1B5; Mon, 30 Mar 2020 13:13:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] kexec: Prevent removal of memory in use by a loaded kexec image To: James Morse Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Eric Biederman , Andrew Morton , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Anshuman Khandual , Bhupesh Sharma References: <20200326180730.4754-1-james.morse@arm.com> <20200326180730.4754-2-james.morse@arm.com> <321e6bf7-e898-7701-dd60-6c25237ff9cd@redhat.com> <9cb4ea0d-34c3-de42-4b3f-ee25a59c4835@redhat.com> <72672e2c-a57a-8df9-0cff-8035cbce7740@redhat.com> <34274b02-60ba-eb78-eacd-6dc1146ed3cd@arm.com> From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABtCREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT6JAlgEEwEIAEICGwMFCQlmAYAGCwkIBwMCBhUI AgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl3pImkCGQEACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1o+VA//SFvIHUAvul05u6wKv/pIR6aICPdpF9EIgEU448g+7FfDgQwcEny1pbEzAmiw zAXIQ9H0NZh96lcq+yDLtONnXk/bEYWHHUA014A1wqcYNRY8RvY1+eVHb0uu0KYQoXkzvu+s Dncuguk470XPnscL27hs8PgOP6QjG4jt75K2LfZ0eAqTOUCZTJxA8A7E9+XTYuU0hs7QVrWJ jQdFxQbRMrYz7uP8KmTK9/Cnvqehgl4EzyRaZppshruKMeyheBgvgJd5On1wWq4ZUV5PFM4x II3QbD3EJfWbaJMR55jI9dMFa+vK7MFz3rhWOkEx/QR959lfdRSTXdxs8V3zDvChcmRVGN8U Vo93d1YNtWnA9w6oCW1dnDZ4kgQZZSBIjp6iHcA08apzh7DPi08jL7M9UQByeYGr8KuR4i6e RZI6xhlZerUScVzn35ONwOC91VdYiQgjemiVLq1WDDZ3B7DIzUZ4RQTOaIWdtXBWb8zWakt/ ztGhsx0e39Gvt3391O1PgcA7ilhvqrBPemJrlb9xSPPRbaNAW39P8ws/UJnzSJqnHMVxbRZC Am4add/SM+OCP0w3xYss1jy9T+XdZa0lhUvJfLy7tNcjVG/sxkBXOaSC24MFPuwnoC9WvCVQ ZBxouph3kqc4Dt5X1EeXVLeba+466P1fe1rC8MbcwDkoUo65Ag0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAGJAiUEGAECAA8FAlXLn5ECGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1qA6w/+M+ggFv+JdVsz5+ZIc6MSyGUozASX+bmIuPeIecc9UsFRatc91LuJCKMkD9Uv GOcWSeFpLrSGRQ1Z7EMzFVU//qVs6uzhsNk0RYMyS0B6oloW3FpyQ+zOVylFWQCzoyyf227y GW8HnXunJSC+4PtlL2AY4yZjAVAPLK2l6mhgClVXTQ/S7cBoTQKP+jvVJOoYkpnFxWE9pn4t H5QIFk7Ip8TKr5k3fXVWk4lnUi9MTF/5L/mWqdyIO1s7cjharQCstfWCzWrVeVctpVoDfJWp 4LwTuQ5yEM2KcPeElLg5fR7WB2zH97oI6/Ko2DlovmfQqXh9xWozQt0iGy5tWzh6I0JrlcxJ ileZWLccC4XKD1037Hy2FLAjzfoWgwBLA6ULu0exOOdIa58H4PsXtkFPrUF980EEibUp0zFz GotRVekFAceUaRvAj7dh76cToeZkfsjAvBVb4COXuhgX6N4pofgNkW2AtgYu1nUsPAo+NftU CxrhjHtLn4QEBpkbErnXQyMjHpIatlYGutVMS91XTQXYydCh5crMPs7hYVsvnmGHIaB9ZMfB njnuI31KBiLUks+paRkHQlFcgS2N3gkRBzH7xSZ+t7Re3jvXdXEzKBbQ+dC3lpJB0wPnyMcX FOTT3aZT7IgePkt5iC/BKBk3hqKteTnJFeVIT7EC+a6YUFg= Organization: Red Hat GmbH Message-ID: <80e4d1d7-f493-3f66-f700-86f18002d692@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 15:13:28 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <34274b02-60ba-eb78-eacd-6dc1146ed3cd@arm.com> Content-Language: en-US X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: > Adding a sentence about the way kexec load works may help, the first para= graph > would read: >=20 > | Kexec allows user-space to specify the address that the kexec image sho= uld be > | loaded to. Because this memory may be in use, an image loaded for kexec= is not > | stored in place, instead its segments are scattered through memory, and= are > | re-assembled when needed. In the meantime, the target memory may have b= een > | removed. >=20 > Do you think thats clearer? Yes, very much. Maybe add, that the target is described by user space during kexec_load() and that user space - right now - parses /proc/iomem to find applicable system memory. > [...] >=20 >>> Load kexec: >>> | root@vm:/sys/devices/system/memory# kexec -l /root/bzImage --reuse-cm= dline >>> >> >> I assume this will trigger >> >> kexec_load -> do_kexec_load -> kimage_load_segment -> >> kimage_load_normal_segment -> kimage_alloc_page -> kimage_alloc_pages >> >> Which will just allocate a bunch of pages and mark them reserved. >> >> Now, AFAIKs, all allocations will be unmovable. So none of the kexec >> segment allocations will actually end up on your DIMM (as it is onlined >> online_movable). >> >> So, the loaded image (with its segments) from user won't be problematic >> and not get placed on your DIMM. >> >> >> Now, the problematic part is (via man kexec_load) "mem and memsz specify >> a physical address range that is the target of the copy." >> >> So the place where the image will be "assembled" at when doing the >> reboot. Understood :) >=20 > Yup. >=20 > [...] >=20 >> I wonder if we should instead make the "kexec -e" fail. It tries to >> touch random system memory. >=20 > Heh, isn't touching random system memory what kexec does?! Having a racy user interface that can trigger kernel crashes feels very wrong. We should limit the impact. >=20 > Its all described to user-space as 'System RAM'. Teaching it to probe > /sys/devices/memory/... would require a user-space change. I think we should really rename hotplugged memory on all architectures. Especially also relevant for virtio-mem/hyper-v balloon, where some pieces of (hotplugged )memory blocks are partially unavailable and should not be touched - accessing them results in unpredictable behavior (e.g., crashes or discarded writes). [...] >> Will probably need some thought. But it will actually also bail out when >> user space passes wrong physical memory addresses, instead of >> triple-faulting silently. >=20 > With this change, the reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC), call would fail. Th= is > thing doesn't usually return, so we're likely to trigger error-handling t= hat has > never run before. >=20 > (Last time I debugged one of these, it turned out kexec had taken the net= work > interfaces down, meaning the nfsroot was no longer accessible) >=20 > How can user-space know whether kexec is going to succeed, or fail like t= his? > Any loaded kexec kernel could secretly be in this broken state. >=20 > Can user-space know what caused this to become unreliable? (without readi= ng the > kernel source) >=20 >=20 > Given kexec can be unloaded by user-space, I think its better to prevent = us > getting into the broken state, preferably giving the hint that kexec us u= sing > that memory. The user can 'kexec -u', then retry removing the memory. >=20 > I think forbidding the memory-offline is simpler for user-space to deal w= ith. I thought about this over the weekend, and I don't think it's the right approach. 1. It's racy. If memory is getting offlined/unplugged just while user space is about to trigger the kexec_load(), you end up with the very same triple-fault. 2. It's semantically wrong. kexec does not need online memory ("managed by the buddy"), but still you disallow offlining memory. I would really much rather want to see user-space choosing boot memory (e.g., renaming hotplugged memory on all architectures), and checking during "kexec -e" if the selected memory is actually "there", before trying to write to it. --=20 Thanks, David / dhildenb